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Revisiting the History of  
Scientific Expert Testimony  
Tal Golan† 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article provides a broad historical narrative of 
scientific expert testimony in the adversarial courtroom, from 
the late eighteenth century to the present. No such narrative 
exists in the current literature and it would good to have one, 
considering the growing attention to the topic in the last two 
decades. This Article identifies four large-scale developments 
that were involved in the shaping of modern scientific expert 
testimony as we have come to know it today: the place of the 
expert in the courtroom; the nature of the expertise deployed; 
the amount and importance of expert testimony; and the 
treatment of expert testimony in the courtroom. 
The first development was part of the fundamental 
transformation of the English legal system that took place 
during the later part of the eighteenth century and came to be 
known as the Adversarial Revolution. This development 
changed the position of the expert in the courtroom, shifting it 
from a neutral court-appointed position to that of a partisan 
witness, chosen and paid by the parties. The second 
development also started during the second part of the 
eighteenth century. It involved changes in the scientific 
community that began to narrow its focus to the inanimate 
world and provided first indications of practical utility. Legal 
historians have paid little attention to this important 
development, which redefined the legal range of recognized 
expertise and introduced into the courtroom a new figure—the 
proto-scientist, who functioned like a skilled professional but 
cogitated like a natural philosopher. The third development 
was associated with the Industrial Revolution and with the 
further development of science. Originating in late eighteenth-
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century England and extending in America well into the late 
nineteenth century, the Industrial Revolution brought to the 
courts a rising tide of cases involving technological and 
scientific argumentation. This development established the 
newly defined scientific expert witness as a pivotal but also 
highly problematic figure in the modern courtroom. The fourth 
development took place during the twentieth century and was 
driven by the professionalization of science and by society’s 
growing dependence on science. This growing dependence 
forced the courts to take an active role in managing the 
deployment of science in the courts, and the professionalization 
and standardization of twentieth century science offered the 
courts new means to do so. Consequently, the twentieth-
century trial judge turned into an active gatekeeper, charged 
with the responsibility of screening unreliable scientific 
evidence away from the jury. 
This Article’s first five parts are structured around 
these developments. Part I discusses the emerging role of the 
partisan expert witness during the Adversarial Revolution. The 
main argument in this Part is that the newly defined expert 
witness was not conceived as a premeditated judicial solution 
to the problems of deploying expertise in the new adversarial 
courtroom. Instead, the partisan expert witness emerged as a 
necessary exception, the only source of information the new 
system could not rationalize under its evolving doctrines. And, 
as such, it would stay—an incompatible yet indispensable 
figure in the modern adversarial courtroom. 
Part II discusses the changing nature of expert 
testimony during the late eighteenth century. To that end, it 
focuses on the 1782 case Folkes v. Chadd, a legal episode that 
became iconic in the legal literature as the origin story for 
modern expert testimony. A close look demonstrates that 
Folkes v. Chadd showed little judicial concern with the 
problems awaiting partisan expertise in the modern 
adversarial courtroom. Instead, the case revolved around a 
different important problem—the legal status of a nascent 
species of experts, the proto-scientists, or Newtonian 
philosophers as they were then styled, who propounded in 
court theories whose station on the legal continuum between 
fact and speculation were yet to be settled. 
Parts III and IV discuss the nineteenth-century 
developments of scientific expert testimony in England and 
America, respectively. They demonstrate that while the volume 
of scientific expert testimony constantly increased during the 
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nineteenth century, the respect paid to it by the courts and the 
public constantly diminished. The main argument here is that 
by the late nineteenth century the putative problem of 
scientific expert testimony had already acquired most of the 
features that today are blithely assumed to be new. These two 
Parts further suggest that, although first raising its head in 
English courts, it was in America that the problem of expert 
testimony reached its fullest expression. 
Part V discusses the twentieth-century attempts to 
control the problem of scientific expert testimony. Much of the 
current scholarship portrays the controversies surrounding 
scientific expert testimony as a late twentieth-century 
development, the result of the difficulties of the courts and the 
lay jury in handling the growing volume and complexity of 
modern science. The discussion in Part VI paints a more 
nuanced picture. Far from being a late twentieth-century 
pathology, the putative problem of scientific expert testimony 
has been chronic for over two centuries. Moreover, during the 
twentieth century, the courts were able to take advantage of 
the professionalization of science and the standardization of 
the market of expertise and actually improved their ability to 
control the performance of science in the courtroom. 
I. THE EMERGING ROLE OF THE PARTISAN EXPERT 
WITNESS 
Common law has long acknowledged the importance of 
scientific advice in cases where the disputed facts were such 
that the courts lacked sufficient knowledge to draw from them 
an informed decision. In 1554, an English judge declared: 
[I]f matters arise in our law which concern other sciences or 
faculties, we commonly apply for the aid of that science or faculty 
which it concerns. Which is an honourable and commendable thing 
in our law. For thereby it appears that we do not despise all other 
sciences but our own, but we approve of them and encourage them as 
things worthy of commendation.1  
Over the centuries the legal system had developed two 
procedural options to deploy such sciences in the courtroom by 
experts who, from their special training and experience, could 
  
 1 Buckley v. Rice Thomas, 1 Plowden 118, 124, 75 Eng. Rep. 182, 192 (1554) 
(Saunders, J.). 
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instruct the court and the jury in regard to the disputed facts.2 
The first option was to call them as jurors.3 The second was for 
the court to nominate them as consultants whose advice the 
court or the jury could adopt as they pleased.4 
There was also a third option, which was for the parties 
to call experts as witnesses testifying on their behalf. 5 
However, unlike court experts and expert juries, there was no 
special procedure that would define such witnesses as experts. 
Thus, physicians and surgeons testified in criminal, insurance, 
and will cases; surveyors testified in property cases; linguists 
testified concerning the meaning of Latin phrases used in 
contracts; merchants concerning the particular customs and 
norms of trade; tradesmen concerning the quality of particular 
goods; ship builders concerning the state and construction of 
vessels; other artisans concerning their respective subjects of 
mechanical skill, and so on and so forth. 6  However, these 
testifying experts were not clearly differentiated from all other 
lay witnesses, who often were also allowed to testify to their 
opinions, especially if it was based on their direct knowledge of 
the facts of the case. Thus, in the absence of a procedure that 
would define witnesses as experts or a theory that would 
restrict lay witnesses from testifying to their opinions, the 
testifying experts were regarded and treated merely as 
witnesses.7 
The theories and practices that differentiated the 
testifying experts from all other lay witnesses evolved only late 
in the eighteenth century, as part of a larger transformation of 
the English legal system that came to be known as the 
Adversarial Revolution. This so-called revolution was primarily 
associated with the expanding presence of lawyers in criminal 
proceedings.8 Until the 1700s, lawyers were generally kept out 
  
 2  J.H. Beuscher, The Use of Experts by the Courts, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 
1108-10 (1941); Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding 
Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40-43 (1902); see also 4 THOMAS ROGER 
FORBES, SURGEONS AT THE BAILEY 26-33 (1985). 
 3  James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 
173-75 (1983). 
 4 Beuscher, supra note 2, at 1109-10. 
 5  Hand, supra note 2, at 43-50. 
 6  Id. 
 7 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE § 1917, at 101-03 (2d ed. 1923).  
 8 John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 263, 307-14 (1978). 
2008] HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY 883 
of criminal trials.9 The judges dominated the proceedings, and 
evidence was mostly adduced by direct in-court altercation 
between the accuser, the accused, and the witnesses, and by 
the judge, who examined the parties and the witnesses 
himself.10 In this environment, which kept criminal proceedings 
quick and simple, testimonial constraints had little, if any, 
meaning.11 Thus, although the common law requirement that 
regular testimony be limited to personal knowledge based on 
experience was old, lay witnesses were nevertheless allowed to 
testify to their opinion or present hearsay evidence. And if an 
objection was raised, the courts were content with allowing it to 
go to the weight of the evidence rather than to its 
admissibility.12  
By the 1730s, defense counsel began to participate in 
regular criminal proceedings. Not yet allowed to directly 
address the jury, they were permitted to gather and adduce 
evidence and examine and cross-examine witnesses. The 
reasons for this “most remarkable change” to ever take place in 
English criminal law (as the noted Victorian judge and legal 
historian Sir James Fitzjames Stephen called it13) are not fully 
clear. It has been suggested that the appearance of the defense 
lawyer was, at least partially, a response to the expanding 
prosecutorial capacities of the Crown.14 Whatever the reasons 
were, by the second part of the eighteenth century, according to 
Stephen, “A practice sprung up . . . by which counsel were 
allowed to do everything for prisoners accused of felony except 
addressing the jury.”15 The active participation of the lawyers 
slowly reshaped the processes of criminal litigation. Outside 
the courtroom the lawyers gave new significance to pretrial 
activities such as preparing records and seeking out witnesses. 
  
 9 J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 352-56 (1986); THOMAS 
ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH 
CRIMINAL JURY 1200-1800, 135-36 (1988); Langbein, supra note 8, at 310.  
 10  See J.S. COCKBURN, HISTORY OF ENGLISH ASSIZES 1558-1714, at 120-21 
(1972). 
 11 Cockburn reports that one judge heard as many as fifty Crown cases a day. 
Id. at 109. 
 12 Charles T. McCormick, Some Observations upon the Opinion Rule and 
Expert Testimony, 23 TEX. L. REV. 109, 109-12 (1945); 9 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 211-14 (1926).  
 13 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND 424 (London, MacMillan 1883). 
 14 Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary 
Procedures in Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 572-80 (1990). 
 15 STEPHEN, supra note 13, at 424.  
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Inside the courtroom they increasingly took over the 
examination of witnesses, developed the techniques of cross-
examination to perfection, and even established the right to 
argue points of law.16 
Looking back, William Best, a leading mid-nineteenth-
century authority on legal evidence, wrote that “the necessary 
consequence of [allowing defense counsel in criminal cases] was 
that objections to the admissibility of evidence were much more 
frequently taken, the attention of the judges was more directed 
to the subject of evidence, their judgments were better 
considered, and their decisions better remembered.”17 Indeed, 
still prohibited from speaking directly to the jury, the lawyers 
mostly fought their battles over the content and the 
presentation of the evidence before the jury in terms of 
evidentiary objections.18 By the end of the eighteenth century 
these evidentiary battles had produced two powerful legal 
doctrines: the hearsay doctrine, which attempted to limit 
testimony to information based solely on personal observation, 
and the opinion doctrine, which sought to control the form in 
which witnesses communicated their perceptions to the jury, 
requiring them not to use inferences where the subject matter 
is susceptible to factual statements.19 
These two powerful evidentiary doctrines rendered the 
expert witness into a distinct legal entity. However, they did so 
indirectly, by curtailing the privileges of all other testimonial 
sources until only the testifying expert was left as the last but 
necessary exception to the rules—a witness who did not have to 
observe the facts of the case personally but nevertheless was 
allowed to pronounce an opinion on them in court. The expert 
  
 16 Landsman, supra note 14, at 539-42, 548-52; John H. Langbein, Shaping 
the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 123-34 (1983); Langbein, supra note 8, at 312. 
 17 W.M. BEST, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE AS 
TO PROOFS IN COURTS OF COMMON LAW § 109, at 99 (Phila., T. & J.W. Johnson 1849).  
 18  See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 101-04, 300-01 
(3d ed. 2001); see generally T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. 
REV. 499 (1999); Stephan Landsman, From Gilbert to Bentham: The 
Reconceptualization of Evidence Theory, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1149 (1990); James 
Oldham, Truth-Telling in the Eighteenth-Century English Courtroom, 12 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 95 (1994). The prohibition on the defense counsel to address the jury in 
summation was abolished by legislation only in 1836. See John M. Beattie, Scales of 
Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 221, 250-58 (1991). 
 19 See Landsman, supra note 14, at 572; Gallanis, supra note 17, at 530-37; 
see also Hand, supra note 2, at 44-45; John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay 
Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 448 (1904). 
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witness was not conceived therefore as a deliberate judicial 
solution to the problems of deploying expertise in the new 
adversarial courtroom. Instead, the expert remained as the 
only source of information the new system could not rationalize 
under its evolving doctrines—a freak, if you will, in the new 
adversarial courtroom. 
The new adversarial system not only redefined the role 
of the expert as a partisan witness but also had a dramatic 
effect on the deployment of expert testimony in the courtroom. 
Traditionally, experts, whether as part of the jury or as court 
advisors, were summoned and controlled by the court, which 
conferred on these experts a large degree of impartiality. But 
during the late eighteenth century, as the court gradually 
assumed a neutral position, as the litigants assumed 
responsibility for developing their own proof in court and 
summoned their own experts to represent them before the jury, 
and as adversarial ideology was given free reign, a demanding 
problem seemed to emerge: how to ensure that in this 
adversarial environment the lay jury would still have access to 
reliable expert guidance when the jury needed it. Surprisingly, 
though, an analysis of major late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth-century rulings finds little judicial awareness of 
this problem. While the judges were certainly busy with the 
delicate act of balancing the demands of the increasingly 
defined rules of evidence with the growing supply of expert 
testimony, they seemed far less concerned that the practice 
itself of calling experts as partisan witnesses was expanding. 
The absence of judicial anxiety about expert testimony 
is all the more remarkable if we take into account that there 
was ample judicial dismay about lay witnesses for hire. The 
late eighteenth century was a period in which the slightest 
interest in the result of the trial rendered the witness 
unreliable.20 Persons were not allowed to testify in cases in 
which they had financial interest.21 Husbands and wives were 
forbidden from testifying for or against each other.22 Even the 
parties to the lawsuit themselves, by the same reasoning, were 
not allowed to testify.23 Why then the expert witness for hire? 
  
 20 1 SIR GEOFFREY GILBERT ET AL., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 105-31 (London, 
W. Clarke & Sons et al., 6th ed. 1801).  
 21  Id. at 106-16. 
 22  Id. at 119-21. 
 23  Id. at 116-19. 
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We will return to this question toward the end of the next 
section.  
II. THE CHANGING NATURE OF EXPERTISE  
The practice of deploying expertise in the new 
adversarial courtroom was not the only thing that was 
changing during the late eighteenth century. A second change, 
equally important, was in the nature of the expertise deployed 
in the courtroom. For centuries, experts summoned to give 
their opinions in the courtroom were men of large and tested 
experience, who, from their special training and experience, 
could instruct the court and the jury in regard to the disputed 
facts. The specialized knowledge these experts brought to the 
courts was expected to be based on personal and empirical 
observations, readily traceable to the specific training and 
experience of the particular expert pronouncing it. Distilled 
through ages of legal experience and immortalized in the early 
seventeenth-century writings of Lord Chancellor Francis 
Bacon, this legal epistemology disdained abstract explanations 
and stressed the necessity of direct observational data in 
processes of proof.24 
By the late eighteenth century, however, a new culture 
of expertise began its rise to dominance, which defied this 
epistemology. This was the culture of science, confident in its 
ability to discern the hidden laws of nature, however subtle 
their workings were. At the start of the eighteenth century, 
this was still a bookish culture that studied nature in general, 
but by the end of the century it had narrowed its focus to the 
inanimate world, supplemented books with experiments, 
borrowed some mathematics, and gave indications of practical 
utility. Its practitioners, who styled themselves men of science 
(the word “scientist” was yet to be invented) or Newtonian 
philosophers (after their great leader, Isaac Newton), may have 
still theorized like natural philosophers, but they increasingly 
acted like skilled professionals. They reasoned from first 
principles but concerned themselves with the observable, the 
measurable, and the practical. By the end of the eighteenth 
century, they became central to Britain’s booming economy—
revolutionizing agriculture; inventing and improving engines, 
pumps, and other machinery; designing and overseeing the 
  
 24 See FRANCIS BACON, THE NEW ORGANON 33-101 (Lisa Jardine & Michael 
Silverthorne eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (1620). 
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construction of waterways, bridges, and harbors.25 It was not 
long before the courts were asked to consider the status of 
these new experts in the courtroom. 
The matter was laid squarely before the courts in the 
1782 civil case of Folkes v. Chadd.26 In this celebrated legal 
episode, several experts were summoned by the litigants to the 
courtroom to testify before the jury to what in their opinion 
caused the decay of a certain harbor on the Norfolk coast of 
England.27 The testimony of one of those experts, a prominent 
Newtonian philosopher named John Smeaton, was excluded by 
the trial judge on the ground that his theoretical explanations 
were “matter of opinion, which could be no foundation for the 
verdict of the jury.”28 On appeal, Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice 
of the Royal Court of King’s Bench, found the silencing of the 
philosopher to be an error and granted a new trial on the 
ground that Smeaton’s theory “was very proper evidence.”29 
Lord Mansfield’s opinion in Folkes v. Chadd has served 
in the legal literature as the principal precedent that shaped 
the dominant option of using expert knowledge in the modern 
adversarial courtroom—calling experts to testify before the 
jury as partisan witnesses. It has been unanimously declared 
“the foundation of the rules governing expert evidence.” 30 
James Thayer maintained that it inaugurated the new practice 
of calling experts as partisan witnesses before the jury. 31  
John Wigmore claimed that it certified experts to pronounce 
opinion without being personally familiar with the facts of the 
case. 32  And recently, Stephan Landsman considered it “the 
court’s seal of approval on the whole adversarial apparatus 
  
 25 See David P. Miller, The Usefulness of Natural Philosophy: The Royal 
Society and the Culture of Practical Utility in the Later Eighteenth Century, 32 BRIT. J. 
HIST. SCI. 185, 185-201 (1999); Richard Sorrenson, Towards a History of the Royal 
Society in the Eighteenth Century, 50 NOTES & REC. ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON 29-46 (1996). 
See generally MARGARET C. JACOB & LARRY STEWART, PRACTICAL MATTER: NEWTON’S 
SCIENCE IN THE SERVICE OF INDUSTRY AND EMPIRE, 1687-1851 (2005). 
 26  Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157, 99 Eng. Rep. 589 (1782). 
 27  Id. Doug. at 157, 99 Eng. Rep. at 589. 
 28  Id. Doug. at 158, 99 Eng. Rep. at 590. 
 29 Id. Doug. at 160, 99 Eng. Rep. at 590. 
 30  Anthony Kenny, The Expert in Court, 99 LAW Q. REV. 197, 199 (1983). 
 31  JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A SELECTION OF CASES ON EVIDENCE AT THE 
COMMON LAW 672-73 (1900). 
 32  4 WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1917, at 103. 
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including contending experts, hypothetical questions, and jury 
evaluation.”33 
What follows below is a close study of Folkes v. Chadd. 
The study confirms that it was indeed a moment of great 
importance for the deployment of expert testimony, but for 
reasons other than those so far suggested by historians. In 
Folkes v. Chadd, Lord Mansfield was intent neither on 
inaugurating a new practice of calling experts as partisan 
witnesses before the jury nor on solving the difficulties that 
awaited such practice in the adversarial courtroom. Instead, 
Mansfield was trying to clarify the legal status of a nascent 
species of experts—proto-scientists, who presented in court 
knowledge claims whose legal status was yet to be settled. 
A. Folkes v. Chadd, Round I 
During the eighteenth century a new breed of 
capitalistic landlords evolved in the northern county of Norfolk, 
England, anxious to experiment with new methods of farming 
that would produce ever larger surpluses for sale. By the end of 
the eighteenth century, Norfolk’s innovative husbandry came 
to be known worldwide as the Norfolk System and its harbors 
were shipping more grain than the rest of England combined.34 
One of these harbors was the tidal harbor of the town of Wells. 
Having no river or other inland fresh water source, Wells 
Harbor had relied for centuries on the strength of the ebbing 
tide to scour the rich silt that the violent tides and winds of the 
North Sea constantly deposited at its bottom. Overflowing 
much of the coast, the tide created a body of water covering 
thousands of acres. With the ebbing of the sea, much of this 
water ultimately collected in the main channel of Wells Harbor, 
providing sufficient scouring to maintain its depth and safety.35 
  
 33 Stephan Landsman, Of Witches, Madmen, and Products Liability: A 
Historical Survey of the Use of Expert Testimony, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 131, 141 (1995); 
see also Kenny, supra note 30, at 199; Stephan Landsman, One Hundred Years of 
Rectitude: Medical Witnesses at the Old Bailey, 1717-1817, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 445, 
491 (1998). 
 34  NAOMI RICHES, THE AGRICULTURE REVOLUTION IN NORFOLK 15-17, 36-42, 
150-52 (1967); PAUL WOODMAN BLAKE, THE NORFOLK WE LIVE IN 36 (3d ed. 1964); 
Nathaniel Kent, Exported Produce of Norfolk, 22 ANNALS AGRIC. (1784-1815) 35 (1793). 
 35 DANIEL DEFOE, A TOUR THROUGH THE WHOLE ISLAND OF GREAT BRITAIN: 
DIVIDED INTO CIRCUITS OR JOURNIES 82-84 (London, J. & F. Rivington, 7th ed. 1769); 
ARTHUR W. PURCHAS, SOME HISTORY OF WELLS-NEXT-TO-THE-SEA AND DISTRICT 63 
(1965); TIDAL HARBOURS COMMISSION, FIRST [AND SECOND] REPORT[S] OF THE 
COMMISSIONERS PRESENTED TO BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT BY COMMAND OF HER 
MAJESTY 444-66 (London, W. Cowes & Sons 1847). See generally M.J. ARMSTRONG, AN 
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In the 1720s, Wells Harbor began to show signs of 
decay.36 The parts of the harbor furthest from the sea became 
increasingly clogged, and by mid-century the quay became 
inaccessible to shipping and the greater part of the cargo had to 
be carried to and from the town by lighters. Wells merchants 
and the ship owners blamed the deterioration of their harbor 
on some of the local landlords, who embanked and reclaimed 
from the North Sea significant tracts of land on both sides of 
the harbor’s main channel. These embankments, Wells 
inhabitants believed, greatly weakened the body of backwater 
available for scouring their harbor, thereby causing it to choke 
up.37  
Fearing for the loss of their livelihood, Wells’ 
inhabitants tried to save their harbor. They financed the 
constructions of two artificial sluices that would scour the 
harbor and keep it open, but to no avail. The conditions of the 
harbor continued to deteriorate.38 Finally, in 1780, confident 
that the embankments were the principal cause of its troubles, 
the Harbor’s board of commissioners decided to take legal 
action against one of the biggest landlords, whose embank-
ment, it felt, was the most harmful to its harbor.39 
The trial took place in August 1781, at the summer 
Assizes in Norwich. The questions put before the jury were 
whether the said embankment harmed the harbor and whether 
the harm justified the cutting of the embankments.40 The trial 
lasted two days. During the first day, the commissioners’ 
lawyers marched a long line of traditional experts to the 
witness stand. Pilots, mariners, and other seamen, who had 
spent their entire life at the harbor, testified from their 
personal experience to the rapid deterioration of the harbor 
following the construction of the said embankment. On the 
  
ESSAY ON THE CONTOUR OF THE COAST OF NORFOLK, BUT MORE PARTICULARLY AS IT 
RELATES TO THE MARUM-BANKS & SEA-BREACHES SO LOUDLY AND SO JUSTLY 
COMPLAINED OF! (Norwich, Crouse & Stevenson 1789). 
 36 JOHN ARMSTRONG, REPORT CONCERNING THE DRAINAGE OF BEDFORD 
LEVEL AND THE PORT OF KING’S LYNN (1724); THOMAS BADESLADE, THE HISTORY OF 
THE ANCIENT AND PRESENT STATE OF THE NAVIGATION OF THE PORT OF KING’S-LYN, 
AND OF CAMBRIDGE, AND THE REST OF THE TRADING-TOWNS IN THOSE PARTS 13-14 
(London, J. Roberts 1725). 
 37 NATHANIEL KENT, GENERAL VIEW OF THE AGRICULTURE OF THE COUNTY OF 
NORFOLK WITH OBSERVATIONS ON THE MEANS OF IMPROVEMENT 9-10 (London, C. 
Macrea 1794); CUCHLAINE A.M. KING, BEACHES AND COASTS 274-75 (1959). 
 38 TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE 9-11 (2004). 
 39 See id. at 11-12 (citing TIDAL HARBOURS COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 
444). 
 40 Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157, 157, 99 Eng. Rep. 589, 589 (1782). 
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second day, it was the landlord’s lawyers’ turn. They presented 
only one expert, Robert Mylne, Fellow of the Royal Society and 
the owner of a thriving London-based architecture-engineering 
practice.41  
Before the trial, upon the invitation of the landlord, Sir 
Martin Browne Folkes, Mylne traveled from London to Wells to 
study its harbor.42 He concluded that the troubles of the harbor 
could not be attributed to Folkes’s embankment or to any other 
embankment. What caused the decay of the harbor were the 
vast quantities of materials discharged at the immense western 
estuaries by the six rivers of Ouse, Nene, Witham, Trent, 
Wharfe, and Swale, and deposited along the north coast of 
Norfolk by the strong tides and winds of the North Sea.43 The 
defense experts, Mylne explained to the jury, had been misled 
by their perceptions. The filling up of the harbor they had 
witnessed was but a mere link in the temporal chain of causes 
imperceptible to lay observation, a chain perceptible only to 
those intimated with the hidden operation of nature.44 
The authoritative testimony of the famous engineer and 
Fellow of the Royal Society, who had made a special study of 
the cause of the trial, made a strong impression on the jurors, 
who, we are told, “relying on the weight of Mr. Mylne’s abilities 
of knowledge, and not having the least doubt of the truth of his 
evidence, found a verdict for the Folkes.”45 Wells’ inhabitants 
were outraged by the arrogance of the metropolitan expert. 
How could a foreigner to the county, lacking intimate 
knowledge of the facts of the case, claim, on the basis of the 
shortest inspection, to recognize forces at work unobserved by 
their own experienced experts, who had spent their entire life 
at the harbor? The commissioners’ lawyers moved for a new 
  
 41 Robert Mylne owned a thriving private architecture/engineering/surveying 
practice. His specialty was bridges but his designs were various. Among other things 
he was appointed architect to St. Paul’s Cathedral and chief engineer of the great New 
River Company that supplied water to London. ALBERT E. RICHARDSON, ROBERT 
MYLNE: ARCHITECT AND ENGINEER, 1733 TO 1811 (1955). 
 42  Id. at 114-16. 
 43  ROBERT MYLNE, MR. MYLNE’S REPORT, ON HIS SURVEY OF THE HARBOUR, 
&C. OF WELLS, IN NORFOLK 4 (Apr. 28, 1781). 
 44 Id. 
 45 See GOLAN, supra note 38, at 23; Notes of the Ordering for a 2nd Trial, 
Folkes, Bart & All Agst. Chadd, Esq. & Others, Norfolk Records Office, MF/RO 504/2, 
MS 486 [hereinafter Notes Ordering 2nd Trial]. This was a standard legal argument 
for a new trial made by a party who felt cheated by a case falsely made at the trial that 
it had no reason to expect and therefore could not come prepared to answer. See, e.g., 
Hartley v. Buggin, 3 Doug. 39, 40, 99 Eng. Rep. 527, 528 (1781) (Mansfield, J.). 
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trial “on the ground that the defendants were surprised by the 
doctrine and reasoning of Mr. Milne.”46 
The royal judges of the King’s Bench, who convened to 
discuss the commissioners’ request, agreed that the 
commissioners should have had the opportunity to counter 
Mylne’s performance with their own experts. “[I]n matters of 
science,” they dictated, “the reasonings of men of science can 
only be answered by men of science.” 47  A new trial was 
therefore granted and was promptly set for the following 
summer term of the Norfolk assizes in July 1782. To avoid 
additional surprises in this important litigation, which “has 
influenced the whole county of Norfolk, and perhaps the whole 
country may be affected by it,”48 the judges directed the parties 
to exchange between them in writing, before the new trial, the 
opinions of the experts whom they intended to produce in court 
“so that both sides might be prepared to answer them.”49 
B. The Experts and Their Reports 
The second round of the Wells Harbor litigation, it was 
clear to all, was going to be decided upon the opinions of men of 
science. Unwilling to be caught off guard again, the 
commissioners of Wells Harbor went out and recruited four 
senior experts—John Grundy, Joseph Nickalls, Thomas 
Hogard, and Joseph Hodskinson—to represent them in the 
coming trial. Grundy was an experienced engineer whose 
specialties included the improvement of river navigation and 
the drainage of adjacent low lands. Nickalls served as an 
appointed engineer to the Thames Commissioners, 
representing their cause in Parliament against loud opposition 
from promoters of competing canal schemes. Hogard 
specialized in fen drainage and served as a commissioner for 
several fen drainage schemes in Lincolnshire. Hodskinson was 
Vice-President of the Society of Civil Engineering and one of 
the most respected land-surveyors in England. No doubt, the 
commissioners of Wells Harbor prepared themselves well for 
the coming scientific battle.50 
  
 46 Folkes, 3 Doug. at 157, 99 Eng. Rep. at 589. 
 47  Id. Doug. at 159, 99 Eng. Rep. at 590. 
 48  See GOLAN, supra note 38, at 24 (citing Notes Ordering 2nd Trial, supra 
note 45, at 67). 
 49 Folkes, 3 Doug. at 157. 
 50 See JOHN SMEATON, FRS 25-26 (A.W. Skempton ed., 1981) [hereinafter 
Skempton, JOHN SMEATON]; GARTH WATSON, THE SMEATONIANS 3-21 (1989). See 
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Sir Martin Browne Folkes added just one more expert to 
his team. But he chose exceptionally well. His expert was  
John Smeaton—Fellow of the Royal Society and a civil engineer 
who was considered the highest authority on harbors in the 
kingdom.51 By 1781, Smeaton had been consulted on more than 
thirty different harbors in England and Scotland.52 Further-
more, he was responsible for the recent successful rescue of 
Ramsgate Harbor, one of England’s largest harbors, from the 
vast amounts of sand that threatened to choke it completely.53 
In addition to his flourishing engineering practice, Smeaton 
also developed a prominent scientific career. Smeaton had 
contributed fifteen papers to the Royal Society’s Philosophical 
Transactions. One of them, describing his experiments with 
waterwheels and windmills, was awarded the Copley Medal, 
the society’s highest award, thereby establishing Smeaton’s 
reputation as one of the Kingdom’s most celebrated natural 
philosophers.54 
In March 1782, Smeaton traveled to Wells and spent 
three days there studying the harbor. Then, he returned to 
London to study further the history of the harbor, read the 
evidence produced in the first trial, and write his report.55 Like 
Mylne before him, Smeaton also concluded that the decay of 
Wells Harbor was caused not by the hand of man but by the 
hidden hand of nature. “To have a clear and comprehensive 
view of the cause of [the] decay,” Smeaton wrote, “it will be 
necessary to shew the natural causes by which the port of 
  
generally A.W. Skempton, The Engineering Works of John Grundy, in 19 
LINCOLNSHIRE HIST. & ARCHAEOLOGY 65 (1984); A.W. Skempton & Esther Clark 
Wright, Early Members of the Smeatonian Society of Civil Engineering, 44 
TRANSACTIONS NEWCOMEN SOC’Y 23 (1971-72). 
 51 M. Dixon, Some Account of the Life, Character, and Works, of Mr. John 
Smeaton, F.R.S., in 1 REPORTS OF THE LATE JOHN SMEATON, F.R.S. xv-xxx (London, 
Longman et al., 2d ed. 1837) [hereinafter SMEATON REPORTS]; see Skempton, JOHN 
SMEATON, supra note 50, at 27-34. 
 52 Among the harbors were Whitehaven, Workington, and Bristol on the west 
coast; Christchurch, Rye, and Dover on the south; Yarmouth, Lynn, Wisebeach, 
Scarborough, and Sunderland on the east; and Aberdeen, Dundee, and Dunbar in 
Scotland. SAMUEL SMILES, LIVES OF THE ENGINEERS, WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THEIR 
PRINCIPAL WORKS 63-73 (London, John Murray 1861).  
 53 SMILES, supra note 52, at 65-70. 
 54 J. Smeaton, An Experimental Enquiry Concerning the Natural Powers of 
Water and Wind to Turn Mills, and other Machines, Depending on a Circular Motion, 
in 51 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS, GIVING SOME ACCOUNT OF THE PRESENT 
UNDERTAKINGS, STUDIES AND LABOURS, OF THE INGENIOUS, IN MANY CONSIDERABLE 
PARTS OF THE WORLD 100-74 (London, L. Davis & C. Reymers 1760). 
 55 JOHN BARNEY, THE TRIALS OF WELLS HARBOUR 15-16 (2000); Skempton, 
JOHN SMEATON, supra note 50, at 28-29; 3 SMEATON REPORTS, supra note 51, at 18. 
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Wells has been formed.”56 Thus, Smeaton commenced with a 
theoretical discussion concerning the general principles that 
govern the creation and decay of tidal harbors by the natural 
forces of the sea and the weather. 
There was a time, Smeaton hypothesized, when nothing 
more than naked sand lay against the bare coast upon which 
the town of Wells stood. At that stage, the tide flowed and 
ebbed uniformly as a continuous sheet of water. But as the 
steady deposition of tidal silt increased the height of the sand, 
tidal waters were eventually left behind that started to cut 
gullies on their way back to the sea. As the land steadily 
increased in height, greater bodies of water were left on it and 
the gullies increased in number, depth, and size. Eventually, 
Smeaton wrote: 
[I]f all were ultimately collected into one, as has been the case with 
the channel of Wells Harbor, the scour would be sufficient to 
maintain a channel through which vessels might be brought from 
the sea, and thus an useful harbour would be formed, which would 
increase in depth and utility by the continuance of the forming 
powers, but yet, only to a certain degree.57 
With the continual elevation of the coast above the 
reach of higher and higher tides, a height would eventually be 
reached from which the process would start to reverse itself. 
The volume of the water left upon the coast would start to 
diminish. Deprived of the scouring action of the backwater, 
first the gullies and finally the main channel would be choked. 
The true story of Wells Harbor, then, Smeaton recounted in his 
report, was that 
the progressional operation of nature, which originally formed the 
harbour of Wells and brought it to maturity, has also occasioned it to 
grow more and more into a state of decay; and will finally close it up, 
and convert into a firm ground, fit for arable purposes, and those of 
pasturage, the very spot where ships have rode at anchor . . . .58 
Two weeks after Smeaton’s departure, the 
Commissioners’ scientific team also arrived to Wells and spent 
ten days there, inspecting the harbor and its surroundings.59 
They did not bother themselves with the general laws 
governing the dynamics of tidal harbors. That would have been 
  
 56 2 SMEATON REPORTS, supra note 51, at 149. 
 57 Id. at 151. 
 58 Id. at 157. 
 59  See GOLAN, supra note 38, at 26, 32-34. 
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to play the part of the natural philosopher. They were civil 
engineers, practical men whose business was to estimate the 
relative effectiveness of the backwater deprived by Folkes’s 
embankment. To that end, they concerned themselves with the 
mappings, measurements, and calculations of the current state 
of the land; its existing areas, enclosed or not; the locations and 
orientations of the neighboring creeks; the length and the 
depth of the main channel; the directions of the winds and the 
tides; etc.60 
Back in London, Hodskinson promptly delivered a 
detailed report to his employers. While Smeaton based his 
report on his dynamic theory of the tidal harbors, Hodskinson 
grounded his on interviews with the local harbor masters and 
on observations and measurements his team had made. The 
interviews convinced him that within local memory not only 
had the coast not grown in breadth or height, but, on the 
contrary, the sea had gained in many places along the coast. 
His copious calculations showed that Folkes’s embankment 
eliminated 214,122 tons of water, about a third of the volume of 
water previously available for scouring the harbor.61 Hodskin-
son concluded: 
Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the present bad and ruinous 
state of the harbor is to be in a great measure, if not wholly, imputed 
to the [said] embankment . . . and that if the tide of the sea is 
permitted to flow and reflow in its ancient course and manner . . ., 
the navigation will be supported and maintained in a safe, useful 
and commodious state by the natural operation of the tidal waters 
thereon.62 
C. Folkes v. Chadd, Round II 
The second round of the Wells Harbor litigation began 
on July 25, 1782, before Henry Gould, Chief Justice of the 
Royal Court of Common Pleas, and a special jury. Two eminent 
counsels ran the trial. Leading the legal team for Folkes, 
unchanged from the previous trial, was Henry Partridge, a 
well-known barrister with strong Norfolk connections. This 
time the commissioners of Wells Harbor brought their own 
heavy legal artillery in the person of George Hardinge, 
  
 60 See Joseph Hodskinson, Report on the State and Causes of the Decay of 
Wells Harbor to the Commissioners for the Preservation of the Harbor of Wells, in TIDAL 
HARBOURS COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 446-49. 
 61  See GOLAN, supra note 38, at 32-33. 
 62 Hodskinson, supra note 60, at 449.  
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Barrister of the Middle Temple and solicitor-general to Queen 
Charlotte.63 
The reports of the experts on both sides were made 
available to the jury a week before the trial. However, when 
the trial began, Hardinge chose not to call upon his experts to 
give oral testimony and be cross-examined. Instead, he 
summoned a long line of mariners and navigators to testify 
from their personal experience to the rapid deterioration of 
their harbor. Partridge, on the other hand, planned to repeat 
his successful strategy and summon his famous scientific 
expert to the witness stand to persuade the jury that it was 
nature, not his employer’s embankment, that was responsible 
for Wells Harbor’s troubles. However, when Partridge tried to 
call Smeaton to the stand, Hardinge objected. The illustrious 
Smeaton, Hardinge contended, should not be permitted to 
speak to the jury since his testimony concerning the hidden 
causes of nature “was matter of opinion, which could be no 
foundation for the verdict of the jury, which was to be built 
entirely on facts, and not on opinions.”64 
Hardinge’s objection was characteristic of the 
evidentiary battles that flourished in the new adversarial 
courtroom.65 Central to these battles was the opinion doctrine, 
which sought to restrict witnesses from expressing their 
opinions where the subject matter was susceptible to factual 
statements. As John Wigmore summarized the status of the 
new opinion doctrine at the end of the eighteenth century: 
“[H]enceforth, the only question can be how far there are to be 
specific exceptions to it.”66 It was with this question in mind 
that Chief Justice Gould addressed Hardinge’s objection to 
Smeaton’s testimony. 
Smeaton’s case seemed straightforward. He was a well-
respected expert and the facts of the Wells Harbor case, which 
he had observed directly, fell well within his field of expertise, 
thus constituting a proper object for his expert opinion. 
Nevertheless, the defense counsel, Hardinge, had firm legal 
  
 63 See entry for “George Hardinge,” in DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 
(1995). 
 64 Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157, 158, 99 Eng. Rep. 589, 590 (1782). 
 65 Hand, supra note 2, at 37; Landsman, supra note 14, at 572. 
 66 Wigmore, supra note 19, at 448. Collecting his data from political state 
trials, Wigmore may have overstated the status of the opinion doctrine in non-political 
criminal and civil proceedings. In 1782, while no longer embryonic, the opinion doctrine 
was still subject to the wide discretion of the individual trial judge. See Hand, supra 
note 2, at 45; Landsman, supra note 14, at 572; Gallanis, supra note 17, at 512-13, 530. 
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ground to stand upon when he maintained that Smeaton’s 
opinion did not rest on the facts of the case but on speculation 
that had no place in court. Smeaton, Hardinge argued, 
transgressed the established legal range of expertise. Expert 
opinions were supposed to be based on calculations and 
empirical observations, readily traceable to the particular 
training and experience of the particular expert pronouncing 
them. Smeaton, on the other hand, propounded in court a high-
minded hypothesis about some natural processes, impercep-
tible to anyone but himself, which allowed him to shift the 
blame for the undisputed decay of the harbor from the obvious 
human hand of his employers to the hidden hand of nature. 
But what kind of training or experience could have qualified a 
person like Smeaton in 1782 as an authority on such matters? 
And what kind of legal reasoning could acknowledge such 
latent causes as a proper foundation for the verdict of the jury, 
which was to be built entirely on facts presented before them in 
court? 
Descending from a long legal lineage, the seventy-two-
year-old Chief Justice Gould was known for the strictness of his 
law. 67  His logic, the logic of the common law, suspected 
elegantly constructed theories and stressed the importance of 
empirical data in processes of proof. Yet, Smeaton’s evidence 
was based on a hypothetical natural process that could have 
taken centuries and could not be measured, tested, or 
otherwise verified. Thus, Chief Justice Gould accepted 
Hardinge’s argument that Smeaton’s evidence indeed “could be 
no foundation for the verdict of the jury” and did not permit 
Smeaton to address the jury from the witness stand.68 With 
Smeaton and his imponderable science out of the way, 
Hardinge won the day as the jury gave a verdict for the 
commissioners, allowing them to cut the embankment that 
choked their harbor.69 Folkes’s lawyers immediately asked for a 
new trial on the grounds that their expert was improperly 
silenced.70 
  
 67 See “Gould, Henry,” in EDWARD FOSS, BIOGRAPHIA JURIDICA: A BIOGRAPH-
ICAL DICTIONARY OF THE JUDGES OF ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO THE PRESENT 
TIME 1066-1870, at 308 (London, John Murray 1870). 
 68 Folkes, 3 Doug. at 158, 99 Eng. Rep. at 590. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See id.  
2008] HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY 897 
D. Mansfield’s Decision 
The request for a third trial was laid before Lord 
Mansfield, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench and probably the 
most influential judicial figure of the eighteenth century.71 His 
famous decision is worthy of a lengthy quotation:  
The facts in this case are not disputed. In 1758 the bank was 
erected, and soon afterwards the harbor went to decay. The question 
is, to what has this decay been owing? The defendant says, to this 
bank. Why? Because it prevents the back-water. That is matter of 
opinion:—the whole case is a question of opinion from the facts 
agreed upon. Nobody can swear that it was the cause; nobody 
thought that it would produce this mischief when the bank was 
erected. The commissioners themselves look on for above twenty 
years . . . . It is a matter of judgment, what has hurt the harbour. 
The plaintiff says that the bank was not the occasion of it. . . . Mr. 
Smeaton is called. A confusion now arises from a misapplication of 
terms. It is objected that Mr. Smeaton is going to speak, not as to 
facts, but as to opinion. That opinion, however, is deduced from facts 
which are not disputed—the situation of banks, the course of tides 
and winds, and the shifting of sands . . . Mr. Smeaton understands 
the construction of harbours, the causes of their destruction, and 
how remedied. In matters of science no other witnesses can be called. 
An instance frequently occurs in actions of unskillfully navigating 
ships. The question then depends on the evidence of those who 
understand such matters; and when such questions come before me, 
I always send for some of the brethren of Trinity House. I cannot 
believe that where the question is, whether a defect arises from a 
natural or an artificial cause, the opinions of men of science are not 
to be received. . . . I have myself received the opinion of Mr. Smeaton 
respecting mills, as a matter of science. The cause of the decay of the 
harbor is also a matter of science, and still more so, whether the 
removal of the bank can be beneficial. Of this, such men as Mr. 
Smeaton alone can judge. Therefore we are of opinion that his 
judgment, formed on facts, was very proper evidence.72 
Mansfield’s decision has long served as the origin story for the 
rise of partisan expert testimony in the modern Anglo-
American legal system. The first report on Folkes v. Chadd was 
published in 1831, as edited by Henry Roscoe, an experienced 
barrister who based his reports on the records of various 
leading judges. According to Roscoe, early nineteenth-century 
courts regarded Mansfield’s decision as “the principal case on 
  
 71 See 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF 
ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 3-7 (1992) [hereinafter THE MANSFIELD 
MANUSCRIPTS]. 
 72 Folkes, 3 Doug. at 158-59, 99 Eng. Rep. at 590. 
898 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:3 
the admissibility of matter of opinion.” 73  Roscoe further 
elaborated on what was to be learned from Mansfield’s 
decision: “Professional men, when examined on the subject of 
their art or science, are of necessity allowed to state their 
opinions . . . .”74 
The next significant reference to Folkes v. Chadd came 
sixty years later from Professor James Thayer of Harvard Law 
School. Mansfield’s decision, Thayer explained, represented the 
onset of judicial recognition in the modern practice of party-
called expertise. Introducing Folkes in his influential textbook, 
Thayer wrote that, for a long time, “experts were thought of in 
the old way, as being helpers of the court . . . . But at last the 
modern conception came in, which regards the expert as 
testifying, like other witnesses, directly to the jury.”75 
One difficulty with Thayer’s reading of Mansfield’s 
decision lies in the fact that the practice of party-called 
expertise was not novel in 1782. As early as 1678, some of the 
most eminent physicians in the Kingdom, including future 
president of the Royal Society Sir Hans Sloan, were called by 
both sides to testify in a murder case, as to the causes of 
certain symptoms observed in an autopsy and on the general 
proposition as to whether a man could die of wounds without a 
fever.76 In the eighteenth century, party-called expertise was 
also documented in civil proceedings, noticeably in the growing 
area of patent litigation. The practice was recurrent in the 
growing textile trade during the 1760s and 1770s. 77  Tax 
litigation and nuisance litigation also saw the deployment of 
party-called expertise with intense adversarial spirit.78 Indeed, 
Lord Mansfield himself had presided over many patent trials 
and was well familiar with the practice of party-called 
expertise. In the 1760s, for example, he presided over an 
  
 73  See Folkes, 3 Doug. at 160 n.(b). 
 74 Id. 
 75 THAYER, supra note 31, at 673.  
 76 Rex v. Pembroke, 6 Howell’s State Trials 1309, 1337-41 (1678); A. 
Rosenberg, The Sarah Stout Trial: An Early Example of the Doctor as Medical Expert 
Witness, in LEGACIES IN LAW AND MEDICINE 230 (Chester R. Burns ed., 1977). 
 77 R.S. FITTON & A.P. WADSWORTH, THE STRUTTS AND THE ARKWRIGHTS, 
1758-1830: A STUDY OF THE EARLY FACTORY SYSTEM 41-46, 81-83 (1958). 
 78 See William J. Ashworth, “Between the Trader and the Public”: British 
Alcohol Standards and the Proof of Good Governance, 42 TECH. & CULTURE 27, 37 
(2001) (discussing the 1781 excise tax case Rex v. Steele and Others); T.C. BARKER & 
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1900, at 227 n.1 (1959) (noting the 1770 indictment for public nuisance of the copper 
works of Charles Roe and Co.). 
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important patent case that involved a prominent London 
optician, Peter Dollond, and a group of other London opticians, 
in a struggle for patent rights for the design of the refracting 
telescope.79 The case brought to the witness stand a line of 
experts, who testified to optical principles, previous designs, 
and trade secrets involved. 80  In the summer of 1781, 
concomitantly with the Wells Harbor litigation, Lord Mansfield 
presided over another important case involving expert 
testimony—one which revolved around Richard Arkwright’s 
attempt to enforce his monopoly of the carding machine on the 
textile business. The attempt failed, but a second one 
succeeded in 1785, largely thanks to the testimony of scientific 
figures such as William Herschel, Erasmus Darwin, James 
Watt, and Robert Mylne, who vouched under oath to the 
validity of the patent’s principle and specifications.81 
The practice of party-called expertise was therefore not 
new in 1782. Still, one could maintain that the adversarial 
context was novel, and that Mansfield’s decision was the first 
to recognize and legitimate the practice in this new context. 
However, little in Mansfield’s decision could support such 
claim. In fact, Mansfield’s decision displayed a complete 
disregard to Smeaton’s appearance as a partisan witness. If 
anything, Mansfield’s opinion treated Smeaton as if he was a 
court expert. “When such questions come before me,” Mansfield 
reasoned, “I always send for some brethren of Trinity House.”82 
The Trinity House was a famous club of retired sea captains, 
and its brethren functioned as arbitrators and official court 
experts in cases arising out of events on the high seas.83 
  
 79 Richard Sorrenson, Dollond & Son’s Pursuit of Achromaticity, 1758-1789, 
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 80 Id. at 41. 
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Clearly, the deployment of court-nominated experts is not the 
precedent one would choose if intent on inaugurating a new 
practice of calling experts as partisan witnesses selected and 
paid for by the parties. 
John Henry Wigmore, Thayer’s student and the leading 
early twentieth-century authority on evidence, also saw an 
origin story at the bottom of Folkes v. Chadd. Wigmore was 
aware that the practice of party-called expertise was not new to 
the period.84 He also recognized that expert witnesses were yet 
to be differentiated from lay witnesses, who were also allowed 
to testify to their opinions, especially if they were based on an 
intimate knowledge of the facts of the case. 85  Wigmore 
concluded therefore that the distinctiveness of the modern 
expert witness sprang not from the license to testify to opinion 
(which was still shared with lay witnesses), but from the 
exclusive privilege to pronounce an opinion whether or not the 
expert had observed the facts of the case directly.86 It was this 
distinction, according to Wigmore, which made its first 
successful appearance in Mansfield’s decision in Folkes v. 
Chadd: 
Here was a man [Smeaton], who had never seen the place, had no 
“facts” to add, and was going to give . . . his opinion upon the general 
question in doubt, the cause of the decay. Why should he do this? 
Why waste time in listening to numbers of such persons when the 
twelve men in the box have been specially selected for the very 
purpose of having their opinions serve as decisive? There would be 
only one reason for listening to such outside opinions, namely, that 
the witness was such a person that the jury would be really aided by 
his opinion.87  
Thus, Wigmore claimed, Mansfield’s decision epitomized “the 
general recognition by the end of the 1700s, that there was a 
class of persons, i.e., those skilled in matters of science, who, 
though they personally knew nothing about the circumstances 
of the particular case, might yet, perhaps by way of exception, 
give their opinion on the matter.”88 
Wigmore, we know, had his facts wrong. Smeaton not 
only had seen the place, but had also written a detailed report 
on his findings that had been accepted by the court as primary 
  
 84  WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1917, at 101-02. 
 85  Id. at 102. 
 86  Id. at 103. 
 87 Id. at 105-06. 
 88 Id. at 103. 
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evidence. But if Mansfield’s decision was neither about 
inaugurating a new practice of calling experts as partisan 
witnesses before the jury, as Thayer maintained, nor about 
allowing experts to pronounce opinion without being personally 
familiar with the facts of the case, as Wigmore maintained, 
then what was it about? What was the issue that Lord 
Mansfield tried to winnow from the chaff of the protracted 
litigation? 
Having reconstructed the facts of the case, we are now 
able to propose an answer to this question. Lord Mansfield, just 
like Chief Justice Gould before him, was trying to decide the 
merits of Hardinge’s objection, which pitted men of science in 
the old sense (that is, men of large and tested experience) 
against men of science in the new sense (that is, Newtonian 
philosophers), who based their opinions on their privileged 
knowledge of the imponderable laws of nature. Mansfield’s 
decision delivered therefore the authoritative interpretation of 
the King’s Bench concerning the implications of the nascent 
opinion doctrine for experts like Smeaton and Mylne, proto-
scientists who functioned like skilled professionals but 
cogitated like natural philosophers. 
The Wells Harbor litigation therefore did constitute an 
important historical moment in the deployment of expert 
knowledge in the courtroom, but for reasons different from 
those so far suggested. It was a junction in which the 
expanding late eighteenth-century cultures of law and science 
finally crossed paths. The lawyers had been solidifying their 
control over the production and presentation of evidence in the 
legal courtroom. Meanwhile, natural philosophy had become a 
competent branch of applicable knowledge. A noted Newtonian, 
Smeaton presented a conspicuous example of the growing 
importance of natural philosophy as a useful pursuit. For 
example, his experimental studies of waterwheels, the most 
important source of energy during the early stages of the 
industrial revolution, revolutionized their design and improved 
their performance by over thirty percent.89 Thus, although late 
eighteenth-century Englishmen may have still considered the 
opinions of natural philosophers to be less than facts, they 
nevertheless were already more than mere opinions. That was 
also the case concerning the causes behind matters such as the 
  
 89  Terry S. Reynolds, Scientific Influences on Technology: The Case of the 
Overshot Waterwheel, 1752-1754, 20 TECH. & CULTURE 270-95 (1979). 
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decay of harbors, which had been traditionally a matter for the 
experience of the craftsmen and artisans who had built them. 
By 1782, as Mansfield made certain to clarify in his decision, 
these causes were already a “matter of science [about which] 
such men as Mr. Smeaton alone can judge.”90 
Wigmore was therefore right when he considered 
Mansfield’s decision as illustrating the growing legal 
recognition by the end of the eighteenth century that there was 
a new class of witnesses, skilled in matters of science, who 
could give opinions that were not based directly on the 
traditional trustworthiness of the senses. However, this lack of 
positive first-hand evidence was not merely a contingent 
deficiency occasioned by the experts’ failure to personally 
inspect the facts of the case. Rather, it was an inevitable 
consequence of the knowledge these new experts brought to the 
courts, knowledge that often claimed to be based on the 
imponderables of nature, which “nothing but the most 
philosophic eye, by reasoning upon chain of facts, is able to 
discover.”91 
Hardinge’s objection to Smeaton’s testimony forced the 
chief justices of the two central royal courts to reflect on the 
epistemological status of this new style of scientific reasoning 
and on the status of its bearers in the courtroom. Gould, the 
conservative, chose to remain within the guarded line 
delineated by the evolving rules of evidence and excluded 
Smeaton’s theory for not being clearly reducible to hard and 
concrete evidence. This formalist approach, which denied the 
court the services of the most respected expert on the issue 
upon which the whole litigation turned, made no sense to 
Mansfield. “I cannot believe,” he remarked, “that when the 
question is, whether a defect arises from a natural or an 
artificial cause, the opinions of men of science are not to be 
received . . . .”92 Mansfield declared, therefore, that the opinions 
of men of science were an exception to the opinion doctrine. 
Unwilling to distinguish one science from the other, Mansfield 
measured professional reputation instead. If the proposed 
witness was known as an expert on the matter before the court, 
Mansfield prescribed, his opinion was proper evidence.93 
  
 90 Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157, 160, 99 Eng. Rep. 589, 590 (1782). 
 91 2 JAMES HUTTON, THEORY OF THE EARTH 90 (1795). 
 92  Folkes, 3 Doug. at 159, 99 Eng. Rep. at 590. 
 93 Id., Doug. at 160, 99 Eng. Rep. at 590. 
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Smeaton’s appearance as a partisan witness for hire 
played no part in Mansfield’s decision. This disregard was also 
typical of other leading rulings from the late-eighteenth and 
early-nineteenth centuries. One is pressed to find in them 
judicial angst about the growing practice of calling experts as 
partisan witnesses. One may wonder then: Could it be that  
the experienced royal judges overlooked the difficulties that  
might await the deployment of partisan expertise in the new 
adversarial courtroom? Why did they not try to mold a 
procedure that would keep expert advice out of the adversarial 
fire?  
The answer, I would like to suggest, is that late 
eighteenth-century judges counted upon men of science to give, 
by ties of honor, unbiased opinions on matters beyond the ken 
of the jurors. The scientific community had long adopted the 
gentlemanly code of honor as a necessary condition for the 
reliability of the scientific discourse. Gentlemen were bound to 
credit the word of their fellows. The status of the gentleman—
his economic independence, the freedom of his actions, the 
moral discipline he imposed upon himself—guaranteed the 
credibility of his word.94 This social contract worked both ways. 
Nothing ruined gentlemanly status quicker than dishonesty. 
John Locke gave notice in his 1690 guide to the education of 
English gentlemen:  
[T]wenty faults are sooner to be forgiven, than the straining of truth, 
to cover any one by an excuse. . . . [Lying was] a quality so wholly 
inconsistent with the name and character of a gentleman, that 
nobody of any credit can bear the imputation of a lye; a mark that is 
judged the utmost disgrace, which debases a man to the lowest 
degree of a shameful manners, and ranks him with the most 
contemptible part of mankind, and the abhorred rascality, and it is 
not to endure by anyone, who would converse with people of 
condition, or have any esteem or reputation in the world.95 
It was noted that among the seventeenth-century members of 
the Royal Society, “the far greater Number are Gentlemen, free 
and unconfine’d.”96 During the eighteenth century, the Royal 
  
 94 See generally PHILIP MASON, THE ENGLISH GENTLEMAN: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF AN IDEAL (1982); SIMON RAVEN, THE ENGLISH GENTLEMAN (1961); Peter Dear, 
Totius in Verba: Rhetoric and Authority in the Early Royal Society, 76 ISIS 145 (1985). 
 95 JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION §§ 131, 139 (1692) 
(paragraph break omitted) (quoted in STEVEN SHAPIN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF TRUTH: 
CIVILITY AND SCIENCE IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 74 (1995)). 
 96 THOMAS SPRAT, THE HISTORY OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON FOR THE 
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Society continued to strengthen its status as a body of 
disinterested gentlemen who impartially investigated nature 
and toil for no end but the improvement of public good.97 The 
royal judges therefore were not worried about the behavior of 
these new experts and trusted that their testimony would 
correspond to their true opinions.98 
In retrospect, one can only appreciate the irony in this 
late eighteenth-century judicial leniency towards the new 
partisan role men of science took as witnesses in the modern 
adversarial courtroom. This leniency seems to carry the mark 
of the aloofness of the eighteenth-century judiciary, who 
dominated the courtroom to such an extent that they could not 
imagine it otherwise—that a time may come when their 
judicial powers would no longer suffice to control the play of 
partisan expertise in the courtroom. They were soon proven 
wrong. The tremendous nineteenth-century expansion of 
science and technology into industry and other public sectors 
quickly established the scientific expert as a pivotal figure in 
the courtroom and turned partisan expert testimony into an 
acrimonious and persistent thorn in the side of the common 
law. We will attend to these developments in the next two 
sections. 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY 
IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
The 1782 contest of expertise over the implications of 
the tide for Wells Harbor and Lord Mansfield’s subsequent 
decision to allow opinion testimony given by men of science to 
lay anchor in the courtroom were signs of the time—the time of 
the Industrial Revolution and the rising tide it brought of legal 
cases involving technological and scientific argumentation. 
Thus, during the early nineteenth century, among the crowd of 
experts who were allowed into the witness stand, besides the 
traditional figures of the physician, the merchant, and the sea 
captain, we find the growing presence of men of science—
chemists, microscopists, geologists, engineers, mechanists, etc. 
  
 97 See generally Miller, supra note 25. 
 98 The circumstances of Folkes v. Chadd provided a good example of this 
judicial trust. Mylne and Smeaton were elite members of the Royal Society. Lord 
Mansfield had previously benefited from their expert services and respected them 
enormously. Clearly, he was not worried that they would testify dishonorably. They 
were men of honor and their integrity guaranteed the truthfulness of their stories. See 
GOLAN, supra note 38, at 51; Notes Ordering 2nd Trial, supra note 45, at 67. 
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These experts untangled for the court and the jury the 
complexities of the growing number of cases involving science, 
in fields ranging from insurance, mining, and energy to 
toxicology, patents, and even regulation. They appraised the 
disputed claims with their experimental techniques and offered 
their knowledge of the principles of nature, which the jurors 
then could apply to the facts at issue before them.99 
The growing judicial recognition of this special class of 
witnesses was not all good news for this rising species of 
experts. It may have underlined the experts’ growing 
importance to the judicial process, but at the same time it 
perpetuated their marginalization within this process. Moving 
across professional and institutional boundaries, from the 
exclusivity of their lecture theaters, private laboratories, and 
societies to the public courtroom, men of science hoped to 
represent laws that were not controlled by human whim. 
Instead, they found themselves manipulated as mere tools in 
the hands of the lawyers. As members of the jury or as advisors 
to the court, they were independent and active participants in 
the legal decision-making process. As witnesses, they found 
themselves isolated in the witness box, away from the decision-
making processes. Browbeaten and set against each other, they 
found their standard strategies for generating credibility and 
agreement unfitted for the adversarial heat of the courtroom. 
The result was a continuous parade of leading men of science 
zealously contradicting each other from the witness stand—a 
parade that started to cast serious doubts on their integrity 
and on their science in the eyes of the legal profession and the 
public. 
A. Severn, King and Co. v. Imperial Insurance Co.  
All this was clearly on display during a large insurance 
litigation in the early nineteenth century.100 The case was a fire 
damage claim made in 1820 by the owners of a large sugar 
factory in London against four insurance companies. Shortly 
before the fire, the factory introduced a new process that 
pumped hot whale oil through copper coils immersed in the 
  
 99 For detailed analyses of many of these cases, see GOLAN, supra note 38, at 
52-106.  
 100  The ensuing description of this case is drawn largely from June Z. Fullmer, 
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sugar pans to boil the sugar solution. The insurance companies 
argued that the new process, the use of which had not been 
reported to them, introduced an increased risk of fire that 
voided the terms of their policies. The ensuing litigation 
revolved therefore around the little known characteristics of 
whale oil and its behavior under frequent application of intense 
heat. 
Both sides of the litigation built their strategies upon 
scientific expert evidence. Virtually every notable chemist and 
chemical technologist in the kingdom was recruited by one of 
the parties. The scientific team for the sugar factory included 
the likes of John Dalton, President of the Manchester Literary 
and Philosophical Society and the author of the first useful 
atomic theory of matter; William Brande, Secretary of the 
Royal Society and Sir Humphry Davy’s successor as professor 
of chemistry at the Royal Institution; Thomas Thomson, a 
professor of chemistry at the University of Glasgow, editor of 
Annals of Philosophy, and the author of the influential System 
of Chemistry; as well as many other top men of science. One by 
one, the members of this dream team stepped onto the witness 
stand and swore for the plaintiffs that the new process was 
infinitely less dangerous than the old process, in which the 
sugar solution was heated over open fire.101  
The insurance companies put together a scientific team 
no less formidable. It included the likes of Michael Faraday, 
chemical operator at the Royal Institution; Arthur Aikin, 
Secretary to the Society for the Encouragement of the Arts and 
the author of the Dictionary of Chemistry; Richard Phillips, 
professor of chemistry at the Royal Military College and 
chairman of the London Chemical Society, and many more. 
These experts testified under oath that the new heating 
process was extremely dangerous because the repeated heating 
and cooling altered the nature of the whale oil, making it 
increasingly volatile and producing highly flammable gases apt 
to explode.102 
Both teams of experts made sure to back up their 
opinions with results from experiments, many of them 
performed especially for the trial. Alas, the experimental 
results presented by the two sides were completely 
contradictory. While the plaintiff’s experts described smooth 
  
 101  See GOLAN, supra note 38, at 56-59. 
 102 See id. at 59-62. 
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operation under all conditions, the defense experts described 
gusts of fire, combustive vapors, and sudden explosions. 
Charging the jury, the presiding judge, Chief Justice Lord 
Dallas, could not hide his utter frustration: 
[T]hey [the jurors] had heard the evidence, he [Dallas] would not say 
of the most intelligent, but of as intelligent men in chymical and 
scientific pursuits as were to be found in this country or in Europe. 
He had himself read the works of some of them, had derived 
pleasure from their labours, and entertained the greatest respect for 
their talents and information. But they had, nevertheless, left the 
Court in a state of utter uncertainty; and the two days during which 
the results of their experiments had been brought into comparison, 
were days, not of triumph, but of humiliation to science.103  
Dallas advised the jury to throw “the contradictory results of 
experiment” out the window, and stated his disgust from the 
partisanship that had been displayed during the trial.104 “It 
must be a matter of general regret,” he said, “to find the 
respectable witnesses to whom he was alluding drawn up, not 
on one side, and for the maintenance of the same truths, but, 
as it were, in martial and hostile array against each other.”105 
The jury found a full verdict for the factory owners and 
the Imperial Insurance Company moved for a new trial on the 
ground that the verdict went against the weight of the 
evidence.106 Discussing the appeal, the judges of the Court of 
Common Pleas approved the request but decided to delay the 
new trial “till one of the other causes [that is, the suits against 
the other three insurance companies] should also have been 
tried, and the result of certain proposed experiments affecting 
the point in dispute be made known.”107 The judges, it seems, 
were hoping that further investigation would allow the 
chemists to clarify their evidence and offer the jury a better 
basis on which to draw an informed conclusion in this 
important litigation, which involved not only large sums of 
money but also the general practice and principles by which 
fire insurance was regulated. 
The stakes were therefore raised for the next trial, 
against the Phoenix Insurance Company. All parties were well 
aware that the results would affect not only the renewed trial 
  
 103 Court of Common Pleas, TIMES (London), Apr. 14, 1820, at 3.  
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 106 Fullmer, supra note 100, at 18. 
 107 See Severn v. Olive, 3 Brod. & B. 72, 72, 23 Eng. Rep. 1209, 1209 (1821). 
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of the first case, but also two other suits still waiting in the 
wings. Both parties recruited therefore even larger crowds of 
scientific experts and doubled their efforts to produce convin-
cing experimental data. Alas, the experts and their evidence 
remained as contradictory as they were in the first trial. Chief 
Justice Lord Dallas, again, did not hide his distress in his 
charge to the jury: 
A vast body of evidence had been laid before the jury; medical men, 
chymical men, eminent men in every department of science, had 
been examined in the course of the trial; but what was the 
lamentable result? The jury had heard of opinion opposed to opinion, 
judgment to judgment, theory to theory, and what was still more 
extraordinary, they had seen the same experiments producing 
opposite results. Who should decide this mighty controversy?  
He [Dallas] professed himself unable to give an opinion. He was  
not unacquainted with scientific subjects, but the little he knew  
only convinced him how much was beyond the reach of his 
knowledge . . . . This he would say of science in its present state, that 
all that belonged to the theory was doubtful, and that all that rested 
on experiment was new.”108 
The jury, again, gave full verdict for the plaintiffs, and 
the insurance companies were directed to honor their policies 
and compensate the factory owners for their trial costs. 
However, the insurance company refused to pay the cost of the 
plaintiffs’ experts. Legal precedent entitled only professional 
men to be compensated for their time and efforts, and the 
insurance companies argued that the plaintiffs’ experts did not 
fall within this category, but belonged instead to the legal 
category of “men of skill,” which included artisan-like experts 
(mechanics, navigators, etc.), who were not entitled to be 
compensated for their troubles and time.109 
A third legal round took place, therefore, which revolved 
around the professional status of the scientific experts involved 
in the trial. The standard was set by the two established 
professions—medicine and law—upper-class oriented vocations 
defined by highly formal and specialized trainings. Alas, the 
welter of experts produced in the trial professed none of these 
traits. Socially they were faceless; intellectually they had just 
been proved incoherent; and their expertise was not based on 
any regulated training but rather self-taught. Thus, it was not 
without a gleeful undertone of score settling that Chief Justice 
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Dallas refused to recognize them as professionals. It took 
chemistry another sixty-five years to reverse this perception.110 
B. Gillespie v. Russell  
The courts may have been unwilling for most of the 
nineteenth century to recognize men of science as professionals 
and compensate them accordingly, but there were plenty of 
others who were ready to pay them for their services in court.111 
Thus, the presence of scientific experts in the courtroom 
continued to grow, and with it the embarrassing display of 
disarrayed definitions, inconsistent experimental results, and 
contradictory opinions. Such cases disturbed the courts 
deeply.112 The royal judges were not naive. They were ready to 
tolerate, to a certain degree, the difference of opinion among 
the scientific experts. Whether a fever that raged in a certain 
neighborhood was or was not caused by the fumes of a factory 
in the vicinity was a matter which admitted no demonstration 
and was considered therefore to be a speculation admitted as 
evidence only out of a necessity because no one else was 
qualified to give a better opinion. Experimental evidence was a 
different story, however. It was considered to be among the 
surest species of evidence, and the judges found it exceedingly 
difficult to accept the fact that similar experimental procedures 
were constantly producing antithetical results when conducted 
by opposed experts. Such conflicting experimental results, they 
believed, represented the partisanship of the men of science 
who produced them, and since these men were highly paid for 
their services, their conduct was seen as the prostitution of 
their science, of selling its credibility to the highest bidder.  
Thus, as the century advanced and the legal use of 
scientific expertise grew exponentially, the court began to 
develop a skeptical view not only toward the opinions of the 
scientific experts but also toward their data—not because 
nature could lie, but because its representatives could. Indeed, 
by mid-century the judiciary no longer expected further 
scientific investigations to clarify the issues before the court. 
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Gillespie v. Russell, heard in 1853 in Edinburgh’s Court of 
Session, provides an example of this change in legal mood.113 
In 1850, William Gillespie, a Scottish landowner, sold 
James Russell and Co., a firm of iron masters, the rights to 
mine coal from his land for the fixed royalty of 13 shillings and 
6 pence per ton.114 Later that year, James Young, an industrial 
chemist from Manchester, patented a revolutionary process 
that allowed for the first time the profitable distillation of 
paraffin oil from coal by low-temperature pyrolysis.115 Finding 
that a certain mineral of the Scottish lowlands, known as 
Boghead coal, yielded particularly high quantities of paraffin 
oil, Young established a large oil production facility in 
Bathgate, Scotland, next to Gillespie’s estate, where the 
Boghead coal was mined. Realizing in retrospect the 
unexpected value of the Boghead coal, Gillespie attempted to 
exclude it from the lease on the grounds that it was not truly 
coal but shale. 116  After a set of inconclusive negotiations, 
Gillespie sued Russell and Co. for mining a mineral not 
included in their lease.117 
The case constituted a direct attack on Young’s 
profitable patent. If the famous Boghead coal was found not to 
be a coal, anyone could use it in Young’s new process without 
infringing upon Young’s patent. The financial stakes were huge 
and both parties assembled unprecedented crowds of mining 
experts, geologists, chemists, and microscopists to debate the 
true identity of said mineral. Alas, although the chemists 
agreed that the great element in coal was carbon, they 
disagreed on how to measure it. All experts concurred that 
since that coal was of organic origin, the classification of the 
mineral in question could be reduced to the microscopic 
examination of its organic content. But while one set of 
microscopists swore that they saw vegetable tissue in the 
substance, the other set was equally sure that there was none. 
Lord President of the Court of Session, Duncan McNeil, was 
exasperated: “I do not care what you call it. I do not care about 
theories of the formation of coal—I do not care about what 
  
 113  Gillespie v. Russell, 3 S.C. 1 (1854). 
 114 For more information surrounding this case, see GOLAN, supra note 38, at 
89-92. 
 115  See James Young, Improvements in the Treatment of Certain Bituminous 
Mineral Substances, and in Obtaining Products Therefrom, 9 CHEMICAL NEWS 249-50 
(1864). 
 116 Gillespie, 3 S.C. at 1-2. 
 117  Id. 
2008] HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY 911 
chemists choose to call it.”118 Whatever it was, he reasoned, 
Gillespie agreed to lease it. Thus, the verdict was given for the 
defendant.119 
Gillespie moved for a new trial on the grounds that the 
scientific evidence was so contradictory that a new trial was 
essential to the justice of the case, and that a new experimental 
investigation be ordered to clarify the science involved.120 Recall 
the similar request made thirty years earlier, in the 1820 
insurance case of Severn, King and Co. v. Imperial Insurance 
Co.121 There, the Court of Common Pleas not only ordered a new 
trial, but also decided to postpone it until further experi-
mentation would be able to reduce the discrepancies among the 
scientific witnesses. By the 1850s, however, the Court of 
Session no longer entertained such high hopes. “[T]hey [the 
scientists] all agreed upon the theory, but they all disagreed on 
what they look at with their own eyes. . . .,” mocked the Lord 
President, “My opinion is, that they would differ in the result to 
the end of time.”122 Lord Rutherford, a second judge, iterated: 
Are we sure that they will be ever agreed? Are we going to get better 
microscopes and better eyes? Shall this branch of science, not only 
new in its name, but in its scientific terms, become new in a much 
more remarkable feature—in the unanimity of its professors? I 
cannot expect that. I do not anticipate it.123  
The request for a new trial was flatly rejected.124 
C. The Disillusionment with Scientific Expert Testimony 
Ironically, the process of disillusionment the legal 
system was going through in its relations with science was not 
the result of some sort of philosophical relativism or 
skepticism. On the contrary, it was the result of hard-dying 
positivism that saw in the scientific method the best passage to 
truth. One of the most authoritative legal texts of the nine-
teenth century, written by Chief Justice and legal historian 
James Fitzjames Stephen, serves as an example of this deep 
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irony. According to Sir James, the quest for both legal truths 
and truths about the physical world “rest upon the same 
foundations . . . . the same great assumptions—the general 
uniformity of Nature, and the general trustworthiness of the 
senses.” 125  Still, scientific knowledge was much closer to 
certainty: 
In physical inquiries the relevant facts are usually established by 
testimony open to no doubt, because they relate to simple facts 
which do not affect the passions, which are observed by trained 
observers, who are exposed to detection if they make mistakes, and 
who could not tell the effect of misrepresentation if they were 
disposed to be fraudulent.126  
No wonder, then, that Stephen too interpreted the constant 
spectacle of leading scientists contradicting each other from the 
witness stand, not as legitimate debates but as a sign of moral 
decadence. “As to want of will to speak the truth, the causes of 
it are infinitely various,” and in this matter, he concluded, “The 
case of experts is as strong a one as can be mentioned. No one 
expects an expert, except in the rarest possible cases, to be 
quite candid. Most of them—are all but avowedly advocates, 
and speak for the side which calls them.”127 
The growing scientific controversies in court have 
resulted therefore in widespread judicial and public 
indignation. In 1862, the conservative Saturday Review 
commented: 
It is a fact that in all matters which require to be investigated 
through the evidence of expert witnesses, the same remarkable 
discrepancies show themselves. Hardly a single patent case is ever 
tried in which men of the highest scientific eminence do not appear 
to contradict one another flatly on the newness of the invention, or of 
some of its parts or stages, and the commonest disputes concerning 
architects’ and engineering bills are constantly calling forth similar 
conflicts of skilled testimony. Even in criminal cases, where the point 
to be decided is whether a particular poison was administrated, or 
whether a death was caused in a particular way, the evidence of the 
experts is generally more contradictory than would be supposed from 
the nature of the inquiry; and, in short, judges and lawyers are 
rapidly coming to the conclusion that skilled testimony, which ought 
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to be the most decisive and convincing of them all, is of all the most 
suspicious and unsatisfactory.128  
Yet the Review admitted, “To suppose that courts can do 
without such evidence would indeed be a stolid and ignorant 
prejudice, for expert witnesses can supply materials for 
judgments not to be obtained from any other source.”129 Still, 
“[t]here is no doubt that a system has been growing up of late 
years under which men of special knowledge are consulted 
under such circumstances as to render their opinions almost 
worthless.”130 
The growing public mistrust of science, and even more 
so of the integrity of the scientists, in such an important 
domain as the legal system, deeply troubled the scientific 
community. The evil done by the scandals in court, scientific 
leaders emphasized again and again, was great not only to the 
administration of justice, but also to the public image of the 
Victorian scientific community, which was toiling hard on its 
professional status and seeking to expand its influence into the 
public domains of education, industry, health, administration, 
and culture in general. The reform of expert testimony 
therefore became one of the hottest topics in the meetings of 
the various scientific and legal societies, and many proposals 
were put forward to remedy the situation.131 
Almost all scientific commentators agreed that the 
disagreements among the scientific witnesses did not reflect 
uncertainties within the body of scientific knowledge itself.132 
Most of them argued that the disagreements were largely 
created by the improper adversarial procedures by which the 
legal system processed scientific knowledge. Others were ready 
to concede that scientific opinions may legitimately differ. But 
even they did not believe that the judge, let alone the lay jury, 
could reliably assess these differences. Each pundit had his 
own reform proposal, but they all seemed to agree on at least 
one of two central elements—that the courts should be allowed 
to call their own independent scientific witnesses, and to 
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appoint, at least in civil cases, scientific assessors who would 
sit next to the judge and advise him on technical matters.133 
However, even those in the legal profession who 
empathized with the frustrated scientific community pointed 
out that the reforms proposed by the scientific community ran 
against the fundamental postulates of the adversarial legal 
system.134 Getting rid of the jury ran against the fundamental 
political right to a trial by a jury of one’s peers. And allowing 
the court to call in assessors or witnesses independent of the 
parties ran against two other equally fundamental postulates—
the right of the parties to control the evidence in court and the 
neutrality of the court. The reform suggestions were therefore 
rejected by the legal profession, who cautioned that “the 
remedy should not be worse than the disease.”135 
The legal profession also resisted the scientific attempts 
to monopolize expertise by drawing a line between scientific 
and non-scientific men. “A man who acquired a particular kind 
of knowledge by long training,” insisted Thomas Webster, a 
leading authority on Patent Law, who played a central role in 
many attempts to reform Patent Law, “was just as much a 
scientific man in his particular art as the man who contributed 
to those wonderful discoveries of science at which we all so 
much rejoice.”136 Thus, it was wrong to speak of scientific men 
as a class to the exclusion of such skilled witnesses. 
With no resolution in sight, the legal and scientific 
fraternities grew belligerent. The legal profession remained 
disturbed by the scientific partisanship displayed in the 
courtroom, while the scientific community remained frustrated 
by the awkward position it occupied in the courtroom. Still, the 
deadlock did not stop the increasing deployment of expert 
testimony in the courts. The growing scope and accuracy of 
scientific knowledge, as well as the constantly enlarging 
application of its principles to the business of everyday life, had 
inevitably expanded the uses of experts and tended to make the 
  
 133 Id. at 120; see, e.g., Committee of Scientific Evidence in Courts of Law, 
Report of the Committee, in 36TH MEETING OF THE BRITISH ASS’N FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE 456, 456-57 (London, John Murray 1867). 
 134  See, e.g., William Odling, Science in the Courts of Law, 7 J. SOC’Y ARTS 167 
(1860). 
 135  CHEMICAL NEWS, Oct. 11, 1862, at 190. 
 136 Robert Angus Smith, Science in the Courts of Law, J. SOC’Y ARTS, Jan. 20, 
1860, at 144 (1860). Thomas Webster wrote the standard textbook on patent law for his 
day, THOMAS WEBSTER, REPORTS AND NOTES OF CASES ON LETTERS PATENT FOR 
INVENTIONS (London, Thomas Blenkarn 1844). 
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courts more and more dependent upon their advice. Still, the 
increasing tendency of lawyers to fortify their cases by the 
testimony of experts did not reflect appreciation for its 
excellence, but rather, the requirements of the rising culture of 
Victorian professionalism. The result was an ironic schism that 
was clearly emerging during the second half of the nineteenth 
century—the same increasingly indispensable expert opinions 
that were treated in everyday life as safe and reliable under 
the mere good faith of social and business reputation were 
considered unsafe and unreliable when given in court under 
oath. 
IV.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT  
TESTIMONY DURING THE NINETEENTH  
CENTURY IN THE UNITED STATES 
The sale of expert advice did not become widespread in 
America until the middle decades of the nineteenth century. 
Once it did, though, the deployment of expert testimony in 
American courts of law grew quickly, and with it all its familiar 
woes. The American legal system observed the same 
adversarial procedures of the common law, while the American 
scientific community advertised the same high expectations 
from the scientific method, as did its English counterpart. 
These two features ensured that in spite of the significant 
differences in the institutional and social dynamics of the legal 
and scientific communities between the two countries, the 
problem of expert testimony would develop in nineteenth-
century America along the same basic pattern displayed in 
England. Thus, as in England, the growing deployment of men 
of science in divergent areas of litigation turned the American 
courts into a lucrative arena for scientific activity.137 And, as in 
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England, this arena soon put on public display the curious 
spectacle of leading scientists disagreeing with each other from 
the witness stand, a view that served to cast doubts on the 
integrity of the experts and their science.138 
A. The Declining Credibility of Scientific Experts  
By 1870, a study on expert testimony was already able 
to report in detail on an “unmistakable tendency on the part of 
eminent judges and jurists to attach less and less importance 
to testimony of this nature,” explaining this result by “the 
surprising facility with which scientific gentlemen will swear to 
the most opposite opinions upon matters falling within their 
domain.”139 Many shared this bleak view. “[W]hoever has read 
the reports of trials or been present at them, in which experts 
are seen arrayed against each other, prostituting at times the 
science which they professed to represent,” wrote U.S. Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Morrison Remick Waite in 1874, “need not 
be told, that the subject of expert testimony as now understood, 
is one of no ordinary importance.”140 
Like their English colleagues, American men of science 
were much concerned with the damage that the scandals in 
court were inflicting on the public image and credibility of their 
emerging community, and, like their English colleagues, they 
were bitter about the adversarial legal machinery that placed 
them in the awkward position of partisan witnesses.141 “[N]o 
class connected with the administration of justice is more 
frequently misunderstood, or abused,” complained Charles 
Himes, a professor of physics and chemistry at Dickinson 
University.142 The improper position of science in court seemed 
to have turned the scientific witness into a legal annoyance:  
  
Handwriting of Junius: A Review, TIMES (London), May 22, 1871, reprinted in THE 
EVIDENCE OF HANDWRITING (Cambridge, Riverside Press 1874). 
 138 See J. SNOWDEN BELL, THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 28-34 
(Phila., Rees Welsh & Co. 1879); EVAN B. LEWIS, THE LAW OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 5-12 
(Phila., Rees Welsh & Co. 1894).  
 139 Expert Testimony, 5 AM. L. REV. 227, 228 (1871). 
 140 Morrison R. Waite, Testimony of Experts, 8 W. JURIST 129, 134-35 (1874). 
 141 See CLEMENS HERSCHEL, ON THE BEST MANNER OF MAKING USE OF THE 
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Comm. of the Bar Ass’n of Boston 1886), edited version reprinted in Clemens Herschel, 
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602, 602-06 (1884); J. Trowbridge, The Imperiled Dignity of Science and the Law, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1896, at 491. 
 142 Chas. F. Himes, The Scientific Expert in Forensic Procedure, 85 J. 
FRANKLIN INST. 407, 412 (1893). 
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[A] sort of intractable, incompatible, inharmonious factor, disturbing 
the otherwise smooth current of legal procedure; too important or 
necessary to be ruled out, too intelligent and disciplined mentally to 
yield without reason to ordinary rules and regulations of the 
court . . . and at the same time possessing an undoubted influence 
with a jury that it is difficult to restrict by the established rules and 
maxims of legal procedures.143 
Both the English and the American legal systems were 
well aware of the need to protect the credulous jury from 
charlatans. Still, neither system was able to lay down a precise 
rule for determining who was and who was not a competent 
expert. The only legal criterion was 800 years old: those 
persons are qualified to speak as experts who possess special 
training and experience in the subject in question. Everything 
beyond this point remained purely a matter of discretion with 
the presiding judge, who had to decide in each case afresh 
whether the particular person offered as an expert witness 
would be admitted or not. In most cases, it was very hard for 
the judge to satisfy himself as to the qualifications of the 
persons offered as experts. Scientific titles and diplomas, and 
professional reputation, carried little judicial meaning during 
the nineteenth century, and preliminary examinations were 
impossible to make. The judges therefore were continually 
forced to decide on the spur of the moment, and often on the 
most difficult subjects, upon the credibility of the persons 
offered as experts. Unable to discriminate with any reasonable 
degree of accuracy between experts and charlatans, the actual 
practice of the courts came to be to admit almost everybody 
presented as experts, leaving it for cross-examination to expose 
quackery, and for the jury to be the judge of the ensuing battles 
between expert witnesses and lawyers.144 
No one, of course, trusted the jury to be able to do this 
job properly. As one distinguished psychologist of the day 
pointed out:  
[T]he average jury is unable to pass judgment on, or even to 
comprehend in any adequate way, many of the questions submitted 
to it—such as motives and capacity of the mind, the power of control, 
the analysis of conduct, and the conditions and influences which 
have been dominant in certain acts; the application of the law, and 
  
 143 Id. at 411-12. 
 144 WILLIAM BEST, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE AND 
PRACTICES AS TO PROOFS IN COURTS OF COMMON LAW §§ 495-496, at 589-93 (London, S. 
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the distinctions of responsibility and accountability; the distinctions 
of science as to the meaning of certain facts, or the recognition and 
discrimination of facts from the mass of statements.145  
Here, however, came into play two critical differences between 
the English and the American situations. While the English 
legal system recognized the jury as the final adjudicator on the 
facts of the case, it nevertheless granted its judges the freedom 
to take part in the questioning of the witnesses, advise the 
counsels in the framing of their questions, and comment fully 
on the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the 
witnesses in their charge to the jury. The authoritative royal 
judges did not hesitate to use these legal instruments to control 
the usage of expert testimony in their court and to guide the 
jury in its assessment of the scientific witnesses and their 
evidence. In addition, from the mid 1860s onward, the English 
courts began to divert cases that involved scientific expertise 
from jury trials to the juryless Chancery Court. At first it was 
mainly patent trials, but in 1875 a parliamentary bill was 
passed that officially granted trial judges unfettered discretion 
in all civil actions to order a trial without a jury in any matter 
requiring scientific evidence that, in their opinion, could not be 
handled by the jury.146  
The American court lacked access to these two 
instruments. The eighteenth-century English notion of the 
institution of the jury as a mainstay of liberty was adopted 
with added zeal in the American colonies, and the fact that 
many judges were laymen with no special claim to legal 
competence only added to the prominence of the jury. The 
Jacksonian faith in the ability of the common man and the 
enduring political philosophy that supported maximizing 
citizen participation in government kept this enthusiasm alive 
throughout most of the nineteenth century to an extent 
unfamiliar in England.147 Consequently, the early nineteenth-
century American juries did pretty much as they pleased. The 
  
 145 T.D. Crothers, A Psychological Study of Jurors, 60 ALB. L.J. 341, 342 
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second half of the century saw a growing pressure by the bar 
and the business community to instill more predictability and 
rationality in the operation of the jury, but the pressure also 
bred popular fears of undue influence. The result was a 
practical compromise that was attained by a sharpening of the 
law/fact dichotomy and the corresponding spheres of judge and 
jury. On the one hand, the power of the jury to determine the 
law, especially in civil cases, was eroded. On the other hand, 
fears of undue influence on the jury were eased by legislative 
and constitutional restrictions on the power of the American 
courts in charging juries.148 By 1889, in twenty-one out of the 
forty-nine U.S. states and territories, judges were expressly 
forbidden by statute or constitutional provision to charge the 
jury on questions of fact.149 And in about half of the remaining 
twenty-eight states and territories, the courts had voluntarily 
adopted the same restriction.150 Only in federal courts and a 
minority of state courts were judges allowed to comment on the 
weight of the evidence in their charge to the jury.151 
American men of science decried the absence of a 
judicial hand that would guide the jury in its difficult task of 
assessing the scientific evidence of the case. “If it be necessary 
to give juries authoritative instruction on points of law, how 
can it be less necessary that they should be similarly instructed 
in matters involving scientific knowledge?” wondered Scientific 
American in 1872:152  
Is it any wonder that the public is beginning to mistrust the value of 
this kind of [scientific] evidence? Such mistrust is based upon good 
grounds enough. As now presented to juries, the testimony of the 
both competent and incompetent witnesses, only serves to muddle 
their intellects, and to complicate rather than make plain the 
facts.153 
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The nineteenth-century American scientific community 
lacked the organization, status, and political resources needed 
to challenge the legal system and its procedures. 154  Most 
attempts to reform the legal procedures of expert testimony 
were initiated by members of the medical and the legal 
professions.155 The reform of expert testimony became one of the 
hottest topics in the meetings of the various bar associations 
that mushroomed in late nineteenth-century America, and 
many bills were drafted to remedy the evils of expert 
testimony.156 For the selection of experts it was suggested that 
they be chosen by the court, either reserving or denying the 
right of the parties to call additional witnesses; that the 
selection of the courts be unassisted or made from an official 
list chosen in some other manner; that the official list be either 
permanent or special for each case. 157  In regard to the 
examination of witnesses, it was recommended that the exami-
nation be by the court, with or without the right of the parties 
to cross-examine, or that there be no examination at all and 
that the expert would submit a report.158 In regard to decisions 
when experts disagree, it was recommended that a jury of 
experts be selected or that an expert sit with the judge during 
the trial to advise him.159 Alas, the American legislature and 
judiciary seemed even more reluctant than their English 
counterparts to dissent from the legal axioms of the adversary 
system. Most reforms bills did not pass the legislative stage, 
and the few that did were promptly held unconstitutional.160 
  
 154 See generally S.G. KOHLSTEDT, THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN 
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY: THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
SCIENCE, 1848-1860 (1976). 
 155 One of the first reform bills was a joint effort of the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences, the Suffolk District Medical Society, the Boston Society for Medical 
Observation, and the Boston Society for medical Sciences. The bill was written by 
Judge Emory Washburn who headed the committee of the Academy of Arts and 
Sciences. See Editorial, 90 BOS. MED. & SURGICAL J. 387-88 (Apr. 16, 1874). For a wider 
look on the efforts of the medical community, see JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE 
LAW: MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 95, 100-05 (1993). 
 156 For a long list of related commentary, see “Evidence, Expert” in INDEX TO 
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION REPORTS AND PROCEEDINGS 176-77 (Dennis A. Dooley ed., 
1942).  
 157  See, e.g., A.M. Kidd, The Proposed Expert Evidence Bill, 3 CAL. L. REV. 216, 
223 (1915). 
 158  See id. at 224. 
 159  See William L. Foster, Expert Testimony: Prevalent Complaints and 
Proposed Remedies, 11 HARV. L. REV. 169, 180-84 (1897).  
 160 Gustav A. Endlich, Proposed Changes in the Law of Expert Testimony, 
1898 PA. BAR PROCEEDINGS 189-221; Foster, supra note 159, at 182-83; Hand, supra 
 
2008] HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY 921 
B. The Failure of the Law of Evidence 
Unable to check either the selection of the experts or to 
guide the jury’s assessment of their evidence, nineteenth-
century American courts concentrated their efforts on the law 
of evidence, in an attempt to check the growing problem by 
regulating the processes through which the experts 
communicated their information in court. 
One major legal doctrine sought to protect the credulous 
jury from being uncritically influenced by the expert’s view by 
preventing the expert from giving his opinion upon the 
“ultimate issue,” that is, the precise factual issue before the 
jury.161 To permit that, it was held, would put the expert in 
place of the jury and invade their province.162 Rational as it 
may sound, the application of this doctrine created great 
confusion and led to absurd consequences. In theory, it made 
irrelevancy a ground for admission, and relevancy for 
exclusion. In practice, the “ultimate issue” was often exactly 
what the expert testimony was all about. The doctrine seemed, 
therefore, to exclude expert evidence exactly where it was most 
needed. Consequently, the courts developed various ways to 
bypass the rule and allow the witnesses to give their opinion on 
the ultimate issue.163 
The most popular procedure was to allow an expert to 
state in general terms whether a certain cause may have 
produced the result under consideration, and leave it to the 
jury to decide whether it did produce it or not. To enable this, a 
second evidentiary doctrine came into play. Under the 
“hypothetical question” doctrine, the expert’s testimony was 
given in the form of answers to hypothetically framed 
questions.164 These questions specified a set of factual premises, 
already submitted in evidence, and the expert was asked to 
draw his conclusion from them, assuming that they were true. 
This cumbersome technique was justified on triple grounds: to 
enable experts to apply their general knowledge to facts that 
were not within their personal knowledge; to allow juries to 
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REV. 483, 483-84 (1911). 
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hear the factual premises upon which expert opinions were 
based; and to allow experts to give their opinions on ultimate 
issues without “invading” the province of the jury. Juries were 
then instructed to credit the opinions only if they believed the 
underlying premises.165 
Sound in theory, the technique broke down in practice. 
If counsel was required to recite all the relevant facts, the 
question became intolerably lengthy; if allowed to select the 
facts, as most courts did, it prompted one-sided hypotheses. 
Designed and controlled by the interested parties, the 
hypothetical question became a means to manipulate the facts 
of the case rather than to clarify them for the jury. “It was a 
strange irony,” Wigmore noted in 1904, that “the hypothetical 
question, which is one of the few truly scientific features of the 
rules of Evidence, should have become that feature which does 
most to disgust men of science with the law of Evidence.”166 
Even the old and powerful hearsay doctrine turned out 
to be problematic in the context of expert testimony. The 
caution of the courts in admitting opinions not based on 
observation of the particular facts of the case, and the fear of 
misleading the jurors by reading to them scientific statements 
they were hardly competent to assess, had led many courts to 
exclude what many considered the most natural source of 
scientific information—standard textbooks, reports, etc. The 
exclusion of these written documents was justified by the 
hearsay doctrine on the premise that they were statements not 
made under oath or that their author was not available for 
cross-examination. As with other doctrines, the courts slowly 
devised ways to work around this one, too. Some courts 
permitted the use of scientific treatises, but only to discredit an 
expert. Others allowed experts to “refresh their memory” by 
reading from standard works. Others even allowed publications 
of exact science, assuming their statements to be of ascertained 
facts rather than of opinion, and excluded other treatises, 
especially medical works.167 Confusion and inconsistency, again, 
were rampant. 
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By the end of the nineteenth century, it was clear that 
the American law of evidence had failed to control the problem 
of expert testimony. Designed to be the crown of modern 
American jurisprudence, a corpus of legal procedures as 
rational as Euclidean geometry, the law of evidence had turned 
instead into a highly complicated and technical domain, 
sagging to the point of collapse under the burden of its own 
distinctions, exceptions, and exclusionary duties.168 In 1898, 
James Thayer called it a “piece of illogical, but by no means 
irrational, patchwork; not at all to be admired, nor easily to be 
found intelligible,” 169  and by 1904, his famous pupil, John 
Henry Wigmore, needed four thick volumes to cover it.170 “There 
is a full realization now,” concluded the Chicago Legal News in 
1909, after a long historical review of expert testimony, “that in 
the present practice we have carried a branch of procedure out 
to the utter defeat of its object, to an absurdity; and that the 
result has been a wide-spread disgust with methods of legal 
administration.”171 
Thus, although first raising its head in the English 
courts, it was in America that the problem of expert testimony 
reached its fullest expression. The diversion in England of 
technical litigation away from jury trials and the efforts of the 
authoritative royal judges seemed to have kept the thriving 
business of expert testimony under relative check. The last 
decades of the nineteenth century saw the bitter English 
debates concerning the problems of expert testimony subsiding. 
Across the Atlantic, however, things went from bad to worse. 
Unable to check either the selection of the experts or their 
evidence in court, or the jury’s assessment of this evidence, late 
nineteenth-century American courts saw the problem of 
scientific expert testimony reach a crisis.172 
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The grim legal mood was captured by Judge Gustav 
Endlich in his 1896 address on expert testimony before the 
prestigious Law Academy of Philadelphia:  
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of language within the bounds of 
decent and temperate criticism, which ought to be regarded as 
excessively severe in commenting upon the expert testimony 
nuisance as it has, of late years, been infesting our courts. In the 
way of wasting the public time, in the way of burdening litigants 
with expense, and in the way of beclouding the real issues to be tried 
and effecting miscarriages of justice, it has grown to the proportions 
of an offensive scandal. Instead of being an aid in the administration 
of the law, it has become a positive hindrance to it. Instead of 
assisting in the approximation of the truth, it has become the means 
of obscuring it. . . . [E]xpert testimony is to-day discredited and 
rightly discredited by the courts, and ridiculed and rightly ridiculed 
by the hard common sense of the people.173 
This outlook was shared by many, in and out of the legal 
profession. Invited to speak on expert testimony before the 
New Hampshire Medical Society at its 1897 annual meeting, 
Judge William Foster chose to open his address with a joke 
popular within legal circles: “There are three kinds of liars,—
the common liar, the [damned] liar, and the scientific expert.”174 
Foster assures his scientific audience:  
This characterization . . . is bestowed . . . not only by defeated 
lawyers and their enraged clients, but also by eminent members of 
the legal profession, both lawyers and judges, as well as by worthy 
and respectable members of the general public outside of the 
professions involved. It is the voice of the people and of the press, as 
well as that of the bench and the bar. It is the fashion.175 
V.  DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
As Endlich’s and Foster’s choice of words made clear, 
the feeling by the end of the nineteenth century was that the 
problem of expert testimony had reached rock bottom.176 The 
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debate over its causes and solution had been picking up steam 
for almost half a century, and the remedies suggested, as 
another judge put it, were “as numerous as prescriptions for 
the cure of rheumatism and generally about as useful.”177 The 
disease was spreading fast, however, and the pressure for a 
remedy, any kind of a remedy, was mounting. Something 
eventually had to give way in the sacred triangulation of the 
adversarial system: either the political postulate of the lay 
jury, the traditional right of the parties to furnish all evidence, 
or the neutral position of the court.  
In 1905, Michigan made the first attempt to accomplish 
such a reform by an act of the legislature. It passed a statute 
that embodied the most popular reform suggestion—that of 
allowing the court to nominate its own experts. The statute 
contained the mildest possible version of such a reform. It did 
not preclude the parties from using their own witnesses but 
provided in criminal cases for the additional appointment by 
the court of no more than three disinterested persons, whose 
identity should not be made public, to investigate issues 
involving expert knowledge and testify to their findings at the 
trial. Nevertheless, the Michigan Supreme Court held the 
statute unconstitutional.178 The court considered it no part of 
the duties of the court to select witnesses.179 Such activity, it 
pointed out, transferred the power of choosing witnesses from 
the prosecutor, an administrative officer, to a member of the 
judicial department, in violation of the provision of the state 
constitution for a separation of powers.180 The court considered 
the statute a violation also of the fundamental right of the 
accused to a fair and impartial trial. The official sanction of 
judicial appointment, the court pointed out, would give the 
court experts an “extraordinary certificate of candor, ability, 
and truthfulness, while the other testimony in the case must be 
judged by the jury by ordinary standards.”181 Declaring the 
legislation in question unconstitutional, the court expressed 
the opinion that the only available remedy for the 
acknowledged evils at which the statute aimed would have to 
  
Testimony—Its Origin, Value, Dangers and Proper Place in Jurisprudence, 4 AM. LAW. 
201, 201-04 (1896); see also Learned Hand’s famous piece on the topic, supra note 2. 
 177 Kidd, supra note 159, at 217. 
 178 People v. Dickerson 129 N.W. 199, 199-201 (Mich. 1910). 
 179  Id. at 200-01.  
 180  Id. at 201.  
 181 Id.  
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be found in a “livelier sense of responsibility to the public for 
the proper and decent administration of justice.”182 
The decision dealt a serious blow to those who had been 
advocating reform of expert testimony by means of statutory 
enactment. Taking their cue from the Michigan Supreme 
Court, and accepting that the experts should remain party-
chosen and the jury still be considered the final trier of facts, 
early twentieth-century American legal scholars concentrated 
their attention on improving the standards of admissibility for 
the party-chosen expert.183 Their renewed hopes of succeeding 
where their predecessors had so miserably failed hinged on a 
clear change in the market of scientific expertise, created by 
the rising professional culture in America. By the second 
decade of the twentieth century, the individual expert who 
developed and marketed his or her own expertise had already 
been replaced by a community of experts who shared, and were 
defined by, common standards of competence and ethics. A 
wide range of expertise, from the scientific and technological 
fields of the chemists, physicists, and engineers, to architects, 
surveyors, actuaries, realtors, insurers, and accountants, came 
to be dominated by professional associations of practitioners. 
These associations developed codes of ethics, standards of 
education, training and practice, and defined minimum 
qualifications of certification either through their own 
examinations or through those of the various state boards of 
examiners.184 
By the second decade of the twentieth century, one can 
find legal scholars pondering the ways in which the courts 
could take advantage of this standardized market of expertise 
to check the problem of expert testimony. “The remedy is not in 
the enactment of any new statute,” wrote one scholar in 1910.185 
“No act of the legislature will make witnesses learned or 
honest. The reform must come from the professions 
themselves.”186 It was not clear exactly how such a reform 
should be carried out. “There is . . . the logical possibility that 
no remedy exists, or that any proposed remedy brings in its 
  
 182 Id.; see also Note, supra note 160, at 483-84. 
 183 E.g., Lee M. Friedman, Expert Testimony: Its Abuse and Reformation, 19 
YALE L.J. 247, 252-57 (1910). 
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train new evils worse that the disease which it cures,” claimed 
another commentator in 1915.187 One thing was clear, though. 
“In the selection of experts no solution can be considered 
satisfactory that does not provide for the selection by the 
profession involved.”188 Eight years later, in 1923, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia came up with the first 
effective formulation of such a solution.189 
A. The General Acceptance Standard  
The decision was occasioned by the newly invented and 
highly publicized lie-detector technology. In 1922, a young 
African-American named James Frye was accused of murder in 
Washington, D.C.190 Frye pleaded not guilty, and his lawyer 
offered one of the inventors of the lie detector, William 
Marston, as an expert witness to testify to the results of a test 
performed on the defendant, which allegedly proved his 
truthfulness.191  The trial judge, Walter Irvin McCoy of the 
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, refused to admit 
Marston and his sensational test in evidence.192 As far as he 
was concerned, McCoy proclaimed, such tests were 
inadmissible until “there is an infallible instrument for 
ascertaining whether a person is speaking the truth or not. . . ., 
[but] I shall be dead by that time, probably, and it will bother 
some other judge, not me.”193 Frye was found guilty, and his 
lawyer appealed on the ground that the scientific expert and 
his evidence were improperly excluded.194 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
likewise was not going to allow the sensational lie-detector test 
into the court. Still, being an appellate court, it needed to 
furnish a better rationale for its exclusion than McCoy’s 
peculiar infallibility standard. This was not an easy task, 
however. In 1923, there was no special rule for the 
admissibility of scientific evidence. Like every other type of 
evidence, scientific evidence was mainly evaluated according to 
  
 187 Kidd, supra note 159, at 218, 223. 
 188 Friedman, supra note 183, at 252; Kidd, supra note 159, at 218, 223. 
 189 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 190 See WILLIAM MOULTON MARSTON, LIE DETECTOR TEST 70-72 (1938). 
 191 See id. at 71-72. 
 192  See James E. Starrs, A Still-Life Watercolor: Frye v. United States, 27 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. 684, 691 (1982). 
 193  Id. at 694.  
 194 Frye, 293 F. at 1014.  
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the traditional evidentiary criteria: the “logical relevancy” of 
the evidence and its helpfulness to the trier of fact, and the 
qualifications of the witness.195 Neither criterion offered the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia much reason to 
exclude the lie detector. The logical relevance of the test and its 
potential helpfulness to the jury were obvious. So were the 
credentials of the test inventor, William Marston. He was a 
lawyer, a member of the Massachusetts Bar, and a well-
published research psychologist, who possessed special training 
and extensive practical experience in the subject in question.196 
Thus qualified, the weight of legal precedent of expert 
testimony was clearly for admissibility.197  
Unable to exclude Dr. Marston and his deception test on 
the basis of the existing admissibility rules, the Frye court put 
forward an innovative rationale that shifted the focus of the 
admissibility process from the expert’s credentials to the 
particular scientific knowledge he proposed to the court.  
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between 
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. 
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle 
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting 
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle 
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be 
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs. We think that the systolic blood 
pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing scientific 
recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as 
would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from 
the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made. The 
judgment is affirmed. 198  
Proposing to look for a general acceptance in the particular 
field to which the expertise belonged, Frye offered a potent 
point of departure from the traditional deadlock of scientific 
expert testimony. The jury was still considered the final trier of 
facts, and the experts would still be party-chosen; but the 
  
 195  See MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK, supra note 162, at 489; JAMES BRADLEY 
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195, at 195-97; David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse 
Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present and Worrying About the 
Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1803-04 (1994). 
 198 Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
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judicial ability to control the market of scientific expert 
testimony was significantly extended from the realm of the 
expert to the realm of expertise.199 
A century and a half earlier, in 1782, George Hardinge, 
barrister of the Middle Temple, suggested a similar rationale  
in Folkes v. Chadd.200 John Smeaton was a worthy expert, 
Hardinge argued, but he propounded in court a theory whose 
scientific status was yet unsettled. Hence, his evidence should 
be excluded. Lord Mansfield rejected the proposed distinction 
between the expert and his expertise. Mansfield’s decision, 
maintaining that it was not for the court to qualify the expert’s 
opinion, shaped the nineteenth-century practice of expert 
testimony.201 If a person was qualified as an expert, his or her 
expert opinion came along; it was the job of the cross-examiner 
to expose the weaknesses of the testimony and for the jury to 
weigh it.202 A century and a half later, the Frye court reintro-
duced Hardinge’s exclusionary logic into the rules of evidence; 
being an expert was no longer enough.203  
The Frye opinion portrayed scientific knowledge as an 
evolutionary process that had to advance from the experi-
mental to a demonstrable stage before it could be accepted in 
the court. This resonated admirably with the pragmatic vision 
of American professional culture that conceived of expert 
knowledge as a communal product that could be objectively 
evaluated, independently from the individual expert.204 In a 
similar fashion, the search for general acceptance within the 
relevant scientific community accorded well with the dominant 
progressive views of the age, which conceived of law as an 
organic part of greater society and emphasized the role of 
coordinated expertise in the joint attempt to run society 
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efficiently and uniformly.205 Still, originating in an extreme case 
and containing no precedential citations, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia remained at first 
an isolated solution to a particular problem. During the 
following three decades, the courts remained content with 
applying the requirement for general acceptance only to 
exorcize from criminal trials evidence derived from various lie-
detection and truth serum schemes.206 It was only in the post-
World War II years that the courts began to apply the general 
acceptance requirement as an exclusive test in a constantly 
broadening range of novel scientific evidence.207 
The growing adoption of Frye signaled the onset of a 
new judicial trend towards ever-greater judicial scrutiny of 
scientific evidence. The expansion of this judicial role during 
the second part of the twentieth century can be described in 
terms of both the scope of the cases to which it has been 
applied and the depth of the judicial scrutiny of the scientific 
evidence. Thus, by the early 1950s, Frye was already addressed 
in the legal literature as the leading criterion for the admis-
sibility of novel types of scientific evidence in criminal trials.208 
In the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted the acquisition 
of evidence in criminal cases via traditional interrogation 
techniques.209 Perhaps in response, crime laboratories flooded 
the courts with innovative scientific technologies, and trial 
judges started to use Frye as a ready-made tool to decide the 
reliability of evidence derived from new techniques such as 
voice prints, neutron activation analysis, gunshot residue tests, 
bite mark comparisons, scanning electron microscopic analysis, 
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truth sera, and numerous others. 210  By the 1970s, Frye’s 
general acceptance standard had become “not only the majority 
view . . . [but] the almost universal view” in the majority of 
criminal courts that considered the admissibility of new 
scientific evidence.211 By the end of the 1980s, the judiciary 
expanded its use from criminal to civil proceedings.212 Finally, 
by the 1990s, as the judiciary grew confident in their ability to 
measure the proffered expert evidence, the courts moved from 
deferring to the judgment of the scientific community to 
independently finding out things for themselves.213 
The expanding judicial dominion over scientific expert 
testimony met with increased criticism.214 The earliest critics 
considered judicial screening of the scientific evidence as an 
unnecessary procedure that deprived the jurors of their right to 
decide for themselves what facts are valuable.215 As the use of 
Frye multiplied, so did its critics—complaining that the general 
acceptance criterion was too vague, too narrow, and too slow.216 
The courts responded by setting forth supporting rationales. 
Their main argument was that Frye finally provided the courts 
with a uniform “method for ensuring the reliability of the 
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scientific evidence.”217 However, in practice, “the thing from 
which the deduction is made” has meant different things to 
different courts at different times. The ambiguities inherent in 
determining the particular field to which new scientific 
evidence belongs, and in deciding how to measure its “general 
acceptance,” left ample room for discretion. Consequently, Frye 
ended up having not one but many general acceptance criteria, 
which the courts seemed to apply in a selective manner, 
according to their own views about the reliability of the 
particular forensic technique before them.218 
Meanwhile, a new twist entered the plot. In 1975, the 
rules that federal judges must follow were finally codified. 
Completely disregarding Frye, the newly enacted Federal Rules 
of Evidence (“FRE”) prescribed no special test to ensure the 
reliability of scientific evidence, new or old. Instead, casting the 
widest net possible, the FRE provided: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
opinion or otherwise.219 
Having left open the question of how one defines “scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge,” the FRE was 
generally interpreted as prescribing a more flexible judicial 
consideration of scientific evidence in order to create the 
opportunity for more types of scientific evidence to be used in 
court.220 On the other hand, since the FRE did not state an 
explicit intent to abandon the Frye rule, some federal and 
almost all state courts remained committed to the “general 
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acceptance” criterion as an absolute prerequisite to the 
admissibility of scientific evidence.221 
The debate concerning the proper judicial attitude and 
standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence intensified 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, heated by growing fears 
of a mass tort litigation explosion.222 Until the 1970s, judicial 
scrutiny of scientific evidence took place almost exclusively in 
criminal cases, where life and liberty are on the line. 223 
However, the 1970s saw the rise of tort law as a new major 
arena for scientific evidence. Dangerous drugs, industrial 
defects, environmental pollutants, and a host of other 
technological breakdowns have all become the subject of 
prolonged civil litigation with ever-escalating financial 
stakes.224 In the great majority of these cases, the central legal 
questions were of risk and causation, which invariably turned 
upon scientific evidence and put on display, again, the all-too-
familiar sight of leading scientific experts producing from the 
witness stand conflicting data and contradictory conclusions.225  
The customary complaints soon followed, and the 
warning was sounded that America’s courts were being 
swamped by “junk science,” produced by an unholy alliance 
between unscrupulous experts and opportunistic attorneys.226 
The judges were urged to raise the bar and rely on the 
conservative interpretation of Frye in order to protect the 
credulous jury from pseudoscientific experts, and the deep-
pocketed corporations from greedy lawyers.227 Others objected. 
The Frye test, they argued, sanctions a stifling and repressive 
scientific orthodoxy that could prevent the courts from learning 
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of authentic scientific innovations and citizens from seeking 
justice.228 Hence, they urged the court to adopt the relaxed 
admissibility requirements of the FRE.229 In short, the two-
centuries-old debate between the Goulds, who maintain that 
the law should exclude from the courtroom certain expert 
opinions for not being scientific enough, and the Mansfields, 
who maintain that the law has no means to give preference to 
one kind of science over another, was back with renewed vigor.  
B. Daubert in Historical Perspective 
The conflict came to a head in 1993, when a civil suit by 
two minors, Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller, and their 
parents, against the giant pharmaceutical corporation Merrell 
Dow was decided by the Supreme Court. Daubert and Schuller 
were born with serious birth defects and blamed them on 
Merrell Dow’s Bendectin, a popular anti-nausea drug their 
mothers took during their pregnancies.230 To prove a causal link 
between the drug and the birth defects, Daubert’s lawyers 
offered eight well-credentialed experts, who based their 
conclusion that Bendectin can cause birth defects on: animal 
studies that found links between Bendectin and malformation; 
chemical analysis which pointed to structural similarities 
between Bendectin and other substances known to cause birth 
defects; and re-analysis of previously published epidemiological 
data that found a link between the drug and birth defects.231 
The federal judge was not impressed, finding that the animal 
studies and the chemical analysis insufficient to show 
causation.232 The meta-analysis of the epidemiological data, he 
further pointed out, was created especially for the trial and  
was neither published nor subjected to peer-review.233 Thus, it 
could not be considered to be generally accepted under Frye. 
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Consequently, the judge granted summary judgment to Merrell 
Dow and threw the case out before it could reach a jury.234 
Daubert’s lawyers appealed all the way to the Supreme 
Court, arguing that the FRE supersedes Frye and that 
according to the FRE, it is for a jury, not a judge, to determine 
the persuasiveness of scientific evidence. The Court agreed 
with the petitioners that Frye was superseded by the FRE, but 
rejected their let-it-all-in interpretation of the FRE. Instead, 
the Supreme Court read the FRE as requiring that the trial 
judge ensure that any scientific evidence admitted into the 
courtroom be reliable. Addressing the main question left open 
by the FRE—how one recognizes valid scientific knowledge—
the Supreme Court acknowledged that ready-made formulae, 
such as the “general acceptance” criterion, failed to provide the 
desired answer.235 Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that an 
answer must be provided, and if a general formula could not be 
furnished, then it was the responsibility of trial judges to make 
their own inquiries in each and every case in order to provide 
it.236 To that end, the Supreme Court took a courageous dip into 
the murky waters of modern philosophy of science and came up 
with a flexible recipe of four non-exclusive factors that could be 
used by the trial judge in determining the quality of the 
scientific evidence proposed: testability, peer review, 
standardization, and general acceptance.237 
Emphasizing the need for independent judicial inquiry 
into the reliability of all scientific evidence, Daubert has been 
widely celebrated as a breakthrough in the attitude of the 
courts towards scientific evidence. The decision was labeled the 
“death of Frye.”238 The seventy years since Frye were declared to 
have been “seven decades of hiding from science,” 239  and 
Daubert’s new set of criteria was hailed as an attempt “to deal 
substantively with the problem of expert testimony in the 
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courts.”240 However, a perspective beyond seven decades allows 
us to see Daubert more as the offspring of Frye rather than its 
killer. True, Daubert displaced Frye, but it also inherited Frye’s 
exclusionary logic. No longer a passive umpire who watches 
over the rules of the game, the twentieth-century trial judge 
has become an active player, a gatekeeper charged with the 
responsibility for screening unreliable scientific evidence. First 
formulated by the Frye court, albeit in a milder form, this 
exclusionary spirit has since come to dominate American legal 
thought, and the Daubert decision only served to affirm it more 
vigorously. Its admissibility criteria may be different, but its 
mindset followed, and put the final stamp on, the twentieth-
century trend toward ever-greater judicial scrutiny of scientific 
evidence.  
VI. DISCUSSION 
What can we learn from this concise history of scientific 
expert testimony? First and foremost, that scientific expert 
testimony in common law courts has a long and rich history. 
This simple lesson is particularly important in the context of 
the current tendency to present the malaise of science in the 
courts as a sign of our time, the result of the growing volume 
and complexity of late twentieth-century science. 241  As this 
Article makes clear, this widely held assumption is flat wrong. 
Far from being new, the putative problems of scientific expert 
testimony in common law courts have existed since science was 
first introduced into the adversarial courtroom. The difficulties 
of fitting science within adversarial procedures; the reluctance 
of courts to mold a procedure that would shield science from 
the adversarial fire; the chronic inability of courts to bridge the 
gap between scientific experts and lay jurors; the failure of the 
legal and scientific professions to regulate the market of 
expertise; the resultant fear of a credulous jury bewitched in 
the name of science by charlatans and opportunists—none of 
these predicaments was new to the twentieth century. 242  
Not only the problems but also the debate over their 
meaning and the ways to resolve them had by the late-
nineteenth century all of the features that today are blithely 
  
 240 ANGELL, supra note 224, at 127. 
 241 See Development in the Law, Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific 
Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1484-85 (1995). 
 242 See supra Parts I-IV. 
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assumed to be new.243 Almost every twentieth-century reform 
proposal can be traced back to the nineteenth century, 
including self-regulation, 244  court-appointed experts, 245  pre-
approved experts lists, 246  scientific tribunals, 247  and expert 
juries.248 All these reform proposals fell flat. Not surprisingly, 
then, the feeling by the late twentieth century was remarkably 
similar to that which prevailed a century earlier: the problem 
of expert testimony had reached rock bottom.249 
Legal scholarship has not been entirely oblivious of the 
problematic history of science in the courts. 250  Still, the 
relevance and significance of this history have been 
undermined by at least two arguments. The first holds that 
experts who served as witnesses in the courts in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, and even in the early twentieth 
century, were not really scientists but experience-based 
experts.251 This argument is, again, wrong. Prominent scientific 
experts made regular appearances in courts of law throughout 
the nineteenth century,252 if not earlier.253 Furthermore, one 
could argue that in these earlier centuries law and science 
actually enjoyed closer, if not better, relations. Indeed, in the 
nineteenth century, which offered scientists very limited career 
opportunities, the legal system stood out as an exceptional and 
most lucrative market for scientific expertise—so much so that, 
while writing about the spectrum of Victorian science 
patronage, one historian of science could not help but wonder 
why it was that “on more than one occasion it would seem . . . 
  
 243 See supra Part III.C. For more on the nineteenth-century reform proposals, 
see GOLAN, supra note 38, at 107-43. 
 244 Edward K. Cheng, Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past and 
Present, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1399-400 (2006). 
 245 Id. at 1393-96; see also Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Court-Appointed 
Experts, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 525, 529-73 (1st ed. 1994). 
 246 Cheng, supra note 244, at 1395-96. 
 247 Id. at 1396-99; see generally Arthur Kantrowitz, Proposal for an Institution 
for Scientific Judgment, 153 SCIENCE 763 (1967); James A. Martin, The Proposed 
“Science Court,” 75 MICH. L. REV. 1058 (1977). 
 248 Cheng, supra note 244, at 1396-98. 
 249 See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 222, at 3-5. 
 250 See, e.g., Hand, supra note 2. For examples of historians’ accounts focusing 
on medical expert testimony, see MOHR, supra note 155; Landsman, supra note 33 
(both articles); see also Hamlin, supra note 131.  
 251  See, e.g., Lee Loevinger, Science as Evidence, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 153, 154 
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 252 See supra Parts III, IV. 
 253 See supra Part II. 
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that all the chemists in London were being shared by aggrieved 
parties in a patent action.”254 In the 1850s, for example, August 
Hofmann, a major figure in the field of organic chemistry and a 
leading consultant to the artificial dye industry, was able to 
pull in a yearly income of eight to nine thousand pounds from 
his court appearances.255 Hofmann made this lofty income in 
patent litigation, which became a most profitable sideline 
activity for many leading men of science on both sides of the 
Atlantic.256 
It would be a mistake, however, to subsume the evolving 
relations between law and science under monetary interests 
alone. Early nineteenth-century scientists dreamt of becoming 
“true amicus curia . . . a terror to the guilty and a joy to the 
innocent.”257 But what had seemed in the early part of the 
nineteenth century as a central civil function of science had 
become by the end of the century a source of discontent. The 
courts were growing increasingly weary and wary of the 
conflicting scientific testimony, and the scientific community 
was growing increasingly bitter with the courts’ deployment of 
its services. Far from being irrelevant, then, the history of 
nineteenth-century scientific expert testimony tells a dramatic 
story: what had started as a great promise of cooperation 
between law and science ended with mutual disenchantment. 
Instead of bringing these two powerful fraternities closer, 
forensic science pulled them further apart.258 
A second assumption that served to discount the 
historical depth of the problems of science in the courts is that 
the growing volume and complexity of science made it 
increasingly harder for the judicial system to manage late 
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twentieth-century science-rich cases.259 However, this widely 
held assumption has never been corroborated by comparative 
historical studies.260 Moreover, it is not clear why we should 
even assume that present-day judges and jurors would find it 
harder to handle the scientific evidence presented before them 
in court. Is DNA profiling really more complicated than 
fingerprinting or nineteenth-century blood tests? Is the science 
involved in testing new pharmaceuticals drugs harder to 
comprehend than the nineteenth-century science involved in 
patenting artificial dyes? Many historians and philosophers of 
science would answer in the negative. Science, they teach, 
advances not by sheer accumulation of details and 
complexities, but by devising new theories with superior 
organizational and predictive powers, which are not necessarily 
more complex. 261 
Even if we concede that modern science did grow more 
complex (certainly it grew richer and far more specialized), we 
can still point to other developments that actually made science 
more accessible to laypersons. Scientific language, literature, 
and training have all been systematized, and its credentials, 
equipment, and procedures standardized. The presentation of 
scientific evidence in court has also been improved by visual 
technologies such as medical imaging and computer animation 
and simulation. Finally, lay understanding of science has 
greatly improved during the twentieth century, following the 
vast increase in the availability of modern education. All this 
supports the notion that a present-day factfinder should find it 
easier, not harder, to handle the scientific evidence presented 
in court. Indeed, during the last two decades, courts have 
consistently pronounced their confidence in the ability of lay 
judges to do just that—to critically evaluate the scientific 
  
 259  See, e.g., CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERN-
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evidence presented to them.262 But if a lay judge can do so on 
her own, why not twelve lay jurors in their combined wisdom? 
The question remains: if the problems of scientific 
testimony were neither new to twentieth-century courts nor 
necessarily harder to manage, then what did change during 
this period? What has driven the unmistakable trend toward 
ever-greater judicial scrutiny of scientific evidence? Further 
research is needed before a convincing answer can be provided. 
Still, any answer would have to take into account the history 
outlined here. The early twentieth-century judicial attitude, I 
suggest, was a direct response to the late nineteenth-century 
crisis of scientific expert testimony. Unable to check either the 
selection of the experts or their evidence in court, or the jury’s 
assessment of this evidence, the nineteenth-century courts 
were forced to admit almost everybody presented as experts, 
leaving juries to assess the ensuing battles between expert 
witnesses and lawyers.263 That changed in the early twentieth 
century with the professionalization of American scientists  
and the standardization of science education, literature, and 
practices. These developments provided the American legal 
system for the first time with the means to control the 
performance of scientific experts in the courtroom—by 
measuring the proffered individual expertise against the field’s 
own standards. First offered by the Frye court, this rationale 
flourished during the middle decades of the twentieth century, 
thereby inculcating the exclusionary judicial attitude toward 
scientific evidence, which reached its high-water mark at the 
end of the century with the Daubert opinion. 
The rise of mass tort litigation during the last quarter of 
the twentieth century helped to extend the new judicial gate-
keeping role from criminal to civil proceedings. 264  The 
extraordinarily complicated nature of this new species of 
lawsuit forced trial judges to become even more active players 
in the litigation process, and to develop new rules and 
procedures with an eye toward both economic consequences as 
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well as broad social and political implications. 265  The far-
reaching effects of this litigation legitimated a new judicial 
role, less arbitral and more managerial in kind.266 Furthermore, 
the unprecedented financial risks for the defendants in mass 
tort cases induced powerful economic players to put their 
weight behind the long-stalling campaign for reform of legal 
procedures for handling expert testimony.267 The results were 
quick to show, and in the early 1990s the two-century-old 
debate was red-hot again. 268  Having never addressed the 
problems of science in the courts, the U.S. Supreme Court 
found it necessary to do so three times during the 1990s, each 
time in the context of a product liability case.269 The important 
outcome of this series of Supreme Court opinions was not the 
oft-discussed four-prong Daubert test, but rather the further 
enhancement of the judicial gate-keeping role and its extension 
to civil proceedings.270 
Finally, one should note that the growing judicial 
scrutiny of scientific evidence has not been driven by the loss of 
judicial faith in science. 271  On the contrary, despite the 
problematic history of science in the courtroom, the legal 
profession has never wavered in its trust in the scientific 
method.272 During the nineteenth century, this steadfast belief 
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induced the judiciary to interpret conflicting expert testimony 
not as legitimate debate, but as a sign of moral decadence.273 
During the twentieth century, it pushed the judiciary even 
further into scientific territory to exorcise charlatanism and 
differentiate good science from bad. Consequently, at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, lay judges find them-
selves deeper than ever in the strange land of biostatistics, 
confidence levels, meta-analysis, and falsifiability, charged 
with the difficult task of weighing the merit of highly 
specialized scientific claims. How well the lay judges can meet 
these challenges and whether their gate-keeping role will lead 
to better adjudication are questions that will bear careful 
watching. 
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